

SECURING NEW YORK

A Blueprint for Meeting New York City's
Homeland Security Requirements

REPORT TO THE WHITE HOUSE



Congressman Joseph Crowley
7th District, New York

June 2002

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PREFACE

June 24, 2002
Washington, DC

The events of September 11th, 2001 are seared into the memories of all Americans. More than 3,000 innocent civilians were killed; thousands of friends and family members were left with a void in their lives that can never be filled again; billions of dollars of damage were done to New York's infrastructure and property; and Americans learned that our commitment to freedom, democracy, and equality inspires hatred in the hearts of extremists and makes us vulnerable to attack in our own country.

Tragedies like the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon test us, both as individuals and as a country. Countless New Yorkers and other Americans demonstrated enormous heroism and courage on September 11th. Many occupants of the World Trade Center stayed behind to help others escape, and some lost their lives in the process. The New York Fire Department lost 343 firefighters who made the ultimate sacrifice in trying to save others. The New York Police Department lost 23 officers, and 75 employees of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey – police officers, facility managers, and others – perished in the collapse of the twin towers, which the Port Authority managed. Many of these individuals refused to leave their duty stations until they helped others escape or secured their areas.

New Yorkers demonstrated their resilience and compassion in the weeks and months that followed the attack, with thousands doing their part to get the City up and running again. Volunteers streamed downtown to help the rescuers at Ground Zero. Businesses in lower Manhattan helped care for recovery workers while working to rebuild their livelihood. Firefighters and construction and sanitation workers worked around the clock to clear the site, remembering that their most important mission was to locate the remains of those killed and honor them as the heroes that they are. Despite terrible personal and financial losses, New Yorkers, by banding together as a community, are working together to get back on their feet.


We owe it to the victims of these horrific events – as well as to their survivors and to the rest of the American people – to do whatever is necessary to protect our homeland from future attacks. New York, as the site of the September 11th attacks and as the country's largest city and economic hub, needs a substantial amount of equipment, training, and funding to adequately protect its residents. With this report, I attempt to outline the City's requirements to enable the Bush Administration to better allocate its proposed \$37.7 billion homeland defense budget.

New York received an enormous amount of federal assistance to rebuild lower Manhattan and support the many businesses, large and small, that suffered financial losses as a result of the attack. President Bush and his advisors must be recognized for their commitment to provide New York City with the resources needed to move this

reconstruction effort forward. Securing this assistance was also made possible by the diligent work of the New York congressional delegation, particularly Senators Hillary Clinton and Chuck Schumer; Representative Charlie Rangel, the dean of the New York City delegation; and Representatives Nita Lowey, Jose Serrano, John Sweeney, Jim Walsh, and Maurice Hinchey, all of whom are members of the House Appropriations Committee. Representatives Robert Menendez and Jane Harman and the entire Democratic Caucus Task Force on Homeland Security, which they have led, must also be recognized for their role in identifying a wide range of approaches to the enormous tasks at hand. In calling for the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security, the Caucus was instrumental in laying the groundwork for President Bush's eventual reorganization plan.

One cannot talk about homeland security in New York City without recognizing the bravery of the men and women of the FDNY, NYPD, Port Authority, and Emergency Medical Services who gave their lives on September 11th and whose colleagues continue to put their lives on the line every day to safeguard their fellow citizens. I hope that my efforts to enhance the security of the City and of the country honor these brave New Yorkers, as well as the 105 residents of New York's 7th Congressional District who perished in the attacks on the World Trade Center.

The past nine months have seen countless funerals, memorial services, vigils, and ceremonies to celebrate the lives of the victims of the September 11th attacks. It is my belief that the implementation of the recommendations in this report, by making New Yorkers and all Americans safer, will also serve to honor their memory.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph Crowley". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline.

Joseph Crowley
Member of Congress

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OVERARCHING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Increase the resources allocated to homeland defense.
- Improve the ability of government agencies at all levels (federal, state, and local) to work together through better implementation of the “Three C’s” – communication, cooperation, and coordination.
- Examine and address security shortcomings at all critical infrastructure -- power plants, nuclear facilities, energy pipelines, train stations, and other critical facilities.

As the country continues to debate how best to organize to fight terror, the threat to our nation’s security remains. Homeland security continues to be desperately under funded, a reality that is not addressed by President Bush’s ambitious plan to consolidate the many federal agencies with homeland security functions into one Cabinet-level department. The reorganization is a welcome proposal that has many constructive elements, and the Congress will give the plan careful and expeditious consideration in the months ahead. The reorganization of a range of federal government agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security will be judged by whether it improves these agencies’ observance of the “Three C’s” – Communication, Cooperation, and Coordination.

As officials in Washington consider how to apply the federal government’s resources and capabilities, it is the cities and major metropolitan areas that are the potential targets for attack, and it is local officials who must determine how best to protect their populations and respond to disasters.

As the horrific events of September 11th demonstrated, New York City is a leading target for terrorist attack. Its population density, with over eight million people living in just over 300 square miles, means that any attack will affect a large number of Americans. New York is a center of national and international commerce through which millions of tourists, millions more businesspeople, and billions of dollars of goods pass through each year. The City’s airports, train stations, and ports are critical to continued regional, national, and international commerce, so any disruption of its transportation infrastructure will have a ripple effect throughout the country and beyond. Finally, New York is a symbol of the United States’ wealth, prosperity, and values, making an attack on Gotham a symbolic assault meant to undermine the strength of our nation as a whole.

New York’s emergency services personnel – its police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel – have trained for large-scale disasters, including terrorist attacks, for many years, yet nothing prepared them for the horrors and chaos of September 11th. The attacks of that day taught the City, State, and federal governments many lessons

about how we might better organize, train, and prepare so we can deter and respond to future attacks on the homeland.

One of the most important lessons learned is the critical role played by local authorities, particularly law enforcement officials and first responders. They are the ones who will manage the initial fallout from an attack, and they must be trained and equipped to meet the challenge. While many Americans focus on the need for improved communication and coordination among federal agencies that have homeland security responsibilities, ensuring effective cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies is equally important if first responders and local authorities are to get the information and capabilities they need at the local level to protect their citizens. Federal assistance is needed to undertake this enormous task, but federal funds must be provided directly to the local officials who best understand their communities' needs. Give local authorities what they need. If the hometown is safe, the homeland is safe.

The City has an enormous range of requirements to meet the homeland security challenge. Many require federal, State or City funding; some require policy or legislative changes; some simply require that we reevaluate how we go about protecting the public's health and safety. Among the most significant steps that must be taken are:

- Protecting key facilities:
 - Conduct vulnerability assessments of all critical infrastructure and transportation systems, including ports, power plants, water treatment plants, airports, train stations, subways, bridges, and tunnels.
 - Make basic enhancements to these facilities' physical infrastructure through such steps as adding fencing, surveillance cameras, and security personnel; conducting background checks on employees with access to secure areas; screening more vehicles and passengers; improving means of communicating with passengers, motorists, and other citizens during a crisis; and adding nuclear, chemical and biological sensors to critical facilities.
- Preparing first responders:
 - Make sure law enforcement and rescue workers have access to the information they need – give more local law enforcement officials access to federal databases and intelligence information in a format they can use, and ensure public safety officers and public health officials have effective, redundant, and interoperable communications networks to enable them to cooperate more effectively during a crisis.
 - Provide additional training and equipment to the City's first responders to enable them to better respond to terrorist incidents, attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, and other large-scale contingencies.
 - Take steps to hire new police officers, firefighters, and other public safety officers and retain those experienced officers who might seek retirement.

- Enhancing border security:
 - Inspect more passengers, ships, and cargos overseas so threats can be intercepted before they enter the United States.
 - Provide federal funding to hire more Customs, Immigration, and Border Patrol personnel to staff border crossings and ports.
 - Augment the Coast Guard’s resources to enable it to maintain its current unsustainable pace of operations and assume additional homeland security missions.
 - Do more to prevent weapons of mass destruction from ever falling in to the hands of terrorists by helping secure these materials overseas.
- Helping communities prepare and recover:
 - Prepare communities to react to crises by training community leaders in how to respond, stockpiling key medicines and vaccines, and adequately funding mechanisms to take advantage of the skills of retired medical professionals and others who can assist in an emergency.
 - Facilitate recovery from future incidents by offering federally backed terrorism insurance and making confiscated terrorist assets available to victims and their families.

While the federal, state, and local governments do their part to improve homeland security, Congress must take action as well. Legislation on a wide range of issues related to homeland security has been introduced, and many good laws have already been passed. This report concludes with an overview of many of the bills on homeland security that remain under consideration and that require swift congressional action.

The task of defending the homeland is a complex one that will take months, or even years, to do effectively. The recommendations in this report are a starting point, an overview of the steps that must be tackled first – organize our government effectively, give adequate resources to federal and local agencies who are on the front lines of homeland defense, ensure cooperation and interoperability between authorities at all levels of government, and pass good laws to facilitate enhancements to key facilities and promote effective government action. If these tasks are undertaken, we will have made enormous progress in protecting our citizenry from further attacks.

While this report aims to outline the major steps that must be taken to enhance New York City’s security, it can also serve as a blueprint for other municipalities to use in determining their priorities and requirements. New York is a role model for the country in many areas, including art, culture, entertainment, and business; let it be a model for homeland security as well.

Summary of Key Recommendations

1. Law enforcement

- (i) Increase information-sharing among federal, state, and local authorities, including by:
 - Providing security clearances to appropriate law enforcement and public health officials
 - Creating “Law Enforcement Sensitive” security classification to permit wider dissemination of intelligence information in a format that is useful to state and local law enforcement
 - Granting local law enforcement greater access to federal databases
 - Funding a New York State wireless network to facilitate communication between state and local law enforcement
- (ii) Provide vehicle screening equipment to agencies, including \$5 million for the Port Authority
- (iii) Implement NYPD’s \$63 million plan to immediately recruit and train an additional 1,500 officers
- (iv) Implement NYPD’s \$12.8 million plan to hire 800 civilians in order to free up cops to walk a beat
- (v) Continue funding Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program and enhance the program’s reach to include law enforcement agencies with homeland security roles (i.e., the Port Authority Police Department).
- (vi) Fund a regional law enforcement training center established by the NYPD.

2. First Response and Consequence Management

A. Programs for First Responders

- (i) Provide wide range of equipment, vehicles, and protective gear to first responders; provide federal assistance in evaluating equipment; and establish federal standards for protective gear
- (ii) Train all first responders in nuclear, chemical, and biological consequence management
- (iii) Augment federal assistance to FDNY through FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters Program
- (iv) Provide federal funding to cover overtime expenses – future and retroactive – for first responders
- (v) Pass pension bills that promote retention of police officers and firefighters
- (vi) Computerize list of hazardous materials storage
- (vii) Provide federal funds directly to cities, not to state governments
- (viii) Support first responder interoperability
- (ix) Assign communications priority for first responders
- (x) Deploy redundant and interoperable communications networks
- (xi) Develop New York State wireless communications network

- B. Programs for the Community
 - (i) Train teachers, school administrators, hospital administrators, and community groups in disaster response
 - (ii) Enhance Citizens Corps and development of volunteer networks

3. Transportation Security

- A. Aviation Security
 - (i) Enhance physical security for key airport infrastructure, including terminals, runways, and fuel tanks
 - (ii) Conduct background investigations on more airport employees, including every employee working beyond the security checkpoint on an airport passenger concourse
 - (iii) Fund additional airport security personnel and equipment
 - (iv) Fund continuing training for airport security personnel
- B. Roads and Highways
 - (i) Conduct vulnerability assessments for roads, bridges, and tunnels
 - (ii) Screen vehicles at bridge and tunnel entrances and procure necessary screening equipment
 - (iii) Monitor traffic and improve communication with motorists
 - (iv) Provide federal guidelines for highway and bridge/tunnel security measures
- C. Public Transportation
 - (i) Establish back-up rail operations center
 - (ii) Place sensors to detect chemical and biological agents in critical subway stations
 - (iii) Improve physical security at bus depots
 - (iv) Improve announcement capabilities in subway and rail stations
 - (v) Tighten employee access to secure areas
 - (vi) Train all public transportation employees on security measures and emergency procedures
 - (vii) Develop a decontamination test program
- D. Rail System
 - (i) Enhance physical security at train yards and tracks owned/operated by PATH, Amtrak, Metro-North, New Jersey Transit, and the LIRR
 - (ii) Screen passengers and baggage
 - (iii) Upgrade rail infrastructure for safety enhancements and to improve inter-city rail performance and reliability in the northeast
 - \$898 million to Amtrak to upgrade security of NY-area tunnels
 - \$515 million to Amtrak to enhance physical security, train employees, improve emergency response capabilities
 - \$101 million to Amtrak to upgrade rail infrastructure in NY
 - \$947 million to Amtrak to enhance Northeast Corridor

- E. Inter-City Bus Networks
 - (i) Enhance physical security at bus terminals
 - (ii) Train all public transportation employees on security measures and emergency procedures
 - (iii) Screen passenger baggage
- F. Other
 - (i) Place chemical and biological detectors in all airport terminals, critical subway stations, and rail and bus stations.

4. Port and Border Security

- A. Prevention
 - (i) Conduct background checks on all people working at ports of entry and for border security agencies
 - (ii) Have shippers and foreign port authorities verify cargos overseas
 - (iii) Provide Coast Guard with resources to inspect incoming ships away from U.S. harbors
 - (iv) Develop a “trusted shipper” program to expedite cargos from low-risk sources
- B. Interdiction
 - (i) Provide additional cargo screening equipment to port authorities, Customs, and Coast Guard
 - (ii) Fund additional Customs, INS, and Border Patrol agents
 - (iii) Improve and standardize training for port security officers
 - (iv) Upgrade physical security at ports
 - (v) Provide funding to Coast Guard for additional personnel and new and upgraded vessels for port security

5. Critical Infrastructure Protection

- (i) Conduct vulnerability assessments at public agencies
- (ii) Tax incentives for conduct of vulnerability assessments by private entities
- (iii) Set minimum security standards for energy infrastructure
- (iv) Enhance security and emergency plans for nuclear power facilities
- (v) Improve security at drinking water sources
- (vi) Install sensors on critical gas, steam, and fuel pipelines
- (vii) Fund cyberspace security
- (viii) Provide additional mail screening equipment to the Postal Service
- (ix) Conduct security training with the private sector

6. Health Care

- (i) Create vaccine clearinghouse to track production and availability of vaccines
- (ii) Stockpile potassium iodide (KI) at City schools and hospitals
- (iii) Train epidemiologists and ER staff to detect biological attacks
- (iv) Enhance communications between hospitals, first responders, and the federal Centers for Disease Control
- (v) Establish a Medical Reserve Corps
- (vi) Improve ability to call up medical professionals in an emergency

7. Recovery

- (i) Make terrorists' assets available to victims' families
- (ii) Guarantee terrorism insurance coverage
- (iii) Create a federal Taskforce and Guidelines on Anti-Terrorism Construction to enhance survivability of buildings affected by future terrorist attacks

8. Foreign Policy Initiatives

- (i) Fund programs to enhance security of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials overseas

I. INTRODUCTION

The September 11th attacks, the first acts of war committed on American soil since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, demonstrated that all Americans are vulnerable. President Bush has asserted that his top national priority is ensuring the security of the United States, and he has proposed to Congress a budget of \$37.7 billion to address the myriad tasks that must be undertaken to safeguard our nation.

Homeland security is an especially critical issue in New York City. As the site of the most devastating of the September 11th attacks, New Yorkers must rebuild their lives and their businesses, and the \$20 billion committed by the federal government to New York will help greatly in rebuilding the homes, businesses, and communities that were devastated by the destruction in lower Manhattan.

The human toll of the September 11th attacks is impossible to quantify. The figures for the number of casualties, the number of widows, or the number of children left without parents are all staggering, but they provide no real insight into the extent to which families, friends, and the entire New York community have suffered.

The economic toll, on the other hand, is easier to grasp.

- In the last quarter of 2001, the City lost 105,000 jobs, a figure that represents a full year of lost job growth.¹ The rate of job loss in New York City in the fourth quarter (3.4 percent) was four times that of the rest of the nation (0.9 percent).² Unemployment rose in the same period from 5.7 percent to 6.8 percent,³ and it rose further by April 2002 to 7.7 percent, the highest monthly rate in over three years.⁴


¹ James Parrot, Deputy Director and Chief Economist of the Fiscal Policy Institute, "Economic Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks and Strategies for Economic Rebirth and Resurgence," Testimony before the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on Economic Development and the Assembly Standing Committee on Small Business, 6 December 2001.

² New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., "Thompson: NYC Shows Small Seasonally Adjusted Job Gain and Drop in Unemployment in January; Job Gain in 2001 Revised to a Loss," press release PR02-03-009, 5 March 2002.

³ New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., "City's Recession Deepens," press release PR02-02-07, 12 February 2002.

⁴ New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., "New York City Gained 7,300 Jobs in April - But Unemployment Rose to 7.7 Percent," press release PR02-05-029, 17 May 2002.

*Monthly Job Growth, NYC and the U.S.,
Percent Change, January 2000 – April 2002*



Source: New York City Comptroller, press release PR02-05-029, 17 May 2002.

- After two years of recovery efforts, by the end of 2003 New York City will have lost an estimated \$83 billion and 57,000 jobs through 2003 as a direct result of the attacks.⁵
- Around 375,000 individuals and almost 15,000 businesses – ranging from large corporations to small mom-and-pop stores – have been dislocated or suffered a severe loss of business, according to the Empire State Development Corporation.⁶ The commercial real estate vacancy rate is 10 percent, double what it was a year earlier. The hotel occupancy rate is the lowest it has been since 1995.⁷
- The City government, which was already expecting a budget gap of \$625 million before the attack, could face a shortfall of an additional \$1 billion in revenues because of lost income tax, sales tax, hotel tax, and reduced consumer and visitor spending.⁸
- The gross city product, a measure of economic activity in New York City, declined by a rate of 4.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001, compared to a 0.2 percent growth for the national economy.⁹

⁵ New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce, “WTC Attacks to Result in Economic Output Loss of \$83 Billion and 57,000 Jobs for City” (press release), 15 November 2001.

⁶ Bruce Mulock, “Small Business Relief: Disaster Assistance,” Congressional Research Service briefing paper, 24 January 2002.

⁷ New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., Testimony before the New York City Council Finance Committee, Fiscal Year 2003 Executive Budget Hearings, 28 May 2002.

⁸ H. Carl McCall, New York State Comptroller, “After the World Trade Center Attack: Fiscal Uncertainties Facing the State and Local Governments,” October 2001, pp. 20-21.

⁹ New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., “Comptroller Thompson: City's Recession Deepens,” press release PR02-02-07, 12 February 2002.

- Further economic disruptions, or even a slowed economic recovery from the September 11th attacks, have a profound impact on the national economy. New York's \$341.8 billion gross city product comprises 3.61 percent of the country's \$9.476 trillion gross domestic product.

With time, buildings and businesses can be rebuilt. Rebuilding New Yorkers' confidence – their sense that they can venture out and take advantage of the greatest city in the world – is another thing entirely. New York is the largest population center in the country, with more than eight million people living in the City and ten million more living in the surrounding area. Steps must be taken to protect these communities. An enormous amount of resources will be needed to improve security in the City's ports, airports, power plants, bridges, tunnels, and other critical infrastructure.

- High-traffic and high-profile facilities located in densely populated areas – a characterization which describes much of New York City – make attractive targets for terrorists.
- Critical infrastructure must be protected from attack so key services – power, water, health care – can continue to be provided to residents during a crisis. This is not just a local issue; as much of the world depends on the New York financial sector, ensuring the continued functioning of the business community is critical to the U.S. and world economy.
- Without an infusion of additional resources, City law enforcement and emergency services agencies cannot undertake new missions without drastically cutting back on the basic services the community expects and requires.

New York: A City For All Americans

Enhancing security measures in New York will directly benefit the eight million people who call the City home, as well as (in many cases) the ten million people who live in the surrounding area. However, New York is so central to the U.S. economy, that steps to prevent further terror attacks in New York will produce payoffs for the rest of the country as well. Consider these facts:

- According to a Rutgers University economic impact study of Port of New York and New Jersey operations, the activities of the seaport alone support 228,946 full time jobs with \$9.9 billion in wages in New York and New Jersey and an additional 413,000 jobs and \$14 billion in wages nationwide.
- New York's people and critical infrastructure are essential for the functioning of the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ, as well as much of the U.S. financial sector. Disruptions affecting this sector would affect investment activity nationwide and around the world.
- The New York area's three major airports (Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark) handled 92.4 million passengers in 2000, and Kennedy and Newark are two of the nation's largest international gateways. It would be difficult for other regional

airports to absorb this level of passenger traffic, making it harder for both tourists and business people to travel in and out of the entire Northeast during a crisis.

Each part of America is closely linked to every other in a tangled web of economic, social, and cultural connections, and the country's largest cities and economic hubs occupy the most critical junctures in this web; disruptions to these locations would cause a ripple effect that echoes throughout the entire country. Such population centers, including New York, therefore need to receive particular attention in the effort to improve homeland security.

Citizens' Concerns and Experts' Views

This report is based principally on the views of New Yorkers and on the perspectives of the federal, State, and City officials charged with guaranteeing the security of the City's people and facilities. Information has been gathered from two principal sources:

- *The citizens of New York's Seventh Congressional District.* Over the course of several months, residents of New York's 7th Congressional District attended seven town hall meetings on the subject of homeland security. New York residents shared their concerns and suggestions and called for the federal government to take the City's needs into account.
- *Government officials.* Several experts on local homeland security requirements attended a symposium in New York's 7th Congressional District at which they discussed their agencies' capabilities, the lessons learned from September 11, and the resources required to meet new challenges. Panelists included representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the New York State Office of Public Security, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the U.S. Coast Guard, Con Edison, and Keyspan Energy. OTHER City and State agencies that provide critical functions to the City (e.g., water, mass transit, roads) were asked to provide their views on their own homeland security needs.

II. HOMELAND DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW

A comprehensive homeland defense strategy must include initiatives to secure our borders, support law enforcement and emergency personnel, bolster the national health care infrastructure, and encourage innovative solutions to complex new challenges. The strategy must address all three phases of homeland defense:


- (i) Prevention of Damage: Measures must be taken to keep terrorists at bay and to interdict them if they come close to executing their mission. Steps to be taken include:
 - Improved sharing of information and intelligence among government agencies;
 - Capital improvements to fortify critical infrastructure;
 - Tighter security measures at airports, seaports, rail and bus stations, commercial hubs, and other centers of activity; and
 - Training and equipment for security personnel.
- (ii) Consequence Management: Communities must be better prepared to manage the consequences of an attack should one occur. Such preparation would include:
 - Training for first responders (firefighters, police, and emergency medical technicians) in a wide range of medical and crisis scenarios, including the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents;
 - Ensuring emergency personnel have interoperable and redundant communications networks;
 - Establishment of alternative sources of power, water, telecommunications, etc.
 - Investments in hospitals and healthcare providers to better identify problems and respond to mass casualties; and
 - Stockpile key pharmaceuticals and develop a mechanism for their swift distribution.
- (iii) Recovery: Initiatives need to be undertaken to help communities recover from the impact of an attack through such measures as:
 - Providing easier access to loans for small businesses affected by an attack;
 - Directing aid to the travel, tourism, and other industries directly affected by an attack; and
 - Extending unemployment, health, and other benefits to individuals affected by a disaster.

Funding for all these initiatives – for training, equipment, and the implementation of new doctrines and organizational structures for government organizations at all levels – is critical.

A. The President's Budget Proposal

President Bush asserted in his State of the Union Address that homeland security is the nation's top priority. He demonstrated his commitment to homeland defense by proposing that Congress appropriate \$37.7 billion in his fiscal year 2003 budget to enhance security nationwide. [Forty billion dollars in additional funds were allocated in a supplemental appropriations bill in late 2001, and President Bush requested \$27.1 billion in additional emergency supplemental funding in March 2002, split almost evenly between the Department of Defense (52% or \$14 billion) and other agencies (48% or \$13 billion), to provide additional funding for the war in Afghanistan, for reconstruction in New York City, to enhance airport security, and to meet other homeland security requirements.]

**PRESIDENT'S FY2003 HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET
WHERE THE FUNDS GO**



Source: White House

Among the main elements of the president's FY2003 budget request proposal are:

- Support to First Responders (\$3.5 billion): Includes improvements to communications infrastructure, personal protective equipment, biological and chemical detection equipment, training, and other items needed by police, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and others who are likely to be the first to arrive at the scene of an attack. The First Responder Initiative will be administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

- Border Security (\$10.6 billion): Includes funds for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to enhance security at the nation's air, land, and sea entry points.
- Aviation Security (\$4.8 billion): Includes funds for the newly created Transportation Security Agency (TSA), which has assumed responsibility for airport security.
- New technology (\$722 million): Includes initiatives to improve information sharing among government agencies at all levels, including an entry-exit visa system for the INS (\$380 million), as well as to protect the security of cyberspace (\$298 million).
- Bio-terrorism (\$5.9 billion): Includes R&D to develop vaccines and other means of detecting and treating biological terrorism; aid to state and local health systems to respond to bio-terrorism attacks; improved communications among agencies charged with preparing for and responding to bio-terrorism; bio-defense equipment; a stockpile of critical pharmaceuticals; upgrades to the capabilities of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC); and programs to ensure the safety of the national food supply.
- Defense Department Programs (\$6.8 billion): Includes enhancements to physical security at U.S. military installations (\$4.6 billion) and the cost of maintaining combat air patrols (CAPs) over selected U.S. cities (\$1.3 billion). [It should be noted, however, that the Administration decided to stop flying CAPs over New York City in March. Though other American cities are certainly in need of such protection, it seems odd that the Defense Department would spend over a billion dollars on this program and not use it to enhance security at the nation's largest population center, the site of countless institutions of economic and cultural significance, and the site of the September 11th attacks.]
- Other programs (\$5.4 billion): Funds programs related to critical infrastructure protection, law enforcement, and other initiatives.

Though the funding outlined above is an excellent start to a comprehensive homeland security plan, several broad areas must be enhanced by the president's proposal:

- Transportation: The president's proposal includes virtually no additional funds for transportation security except for the establishment of additional aviation security measures. Funding is required to enhance security at train and bus stations, along critical rail lines, at bridges and tunnels, and other facilities that are critical to the nation's transportation infrastructure. If the transportation system is disrupted, rescue workers' efforts to reach victims will be hindered, civilians fleeing the scene of a disaster will face obstacles, and goods will be stuck in ports and warehouses (rotting, in the case of perishable goods).

Perhaps our greatest transportation vulnerability is that fuel will be stranded in ports and other storage facilities if it cannot be shipped by road, rail, and sea. The Port of

New York and New Jersey handles more petroleum (3 billion tons per year) than any other American port; when it closed on September 11, airports and fuel suppliers throughout the northeastern United States immediately began calling to find out when the port would resume operations, as the entire region relies on fuel shipments that pass through it.¹⁰

Many House members, recognizing the critical importance of transportation security, have proposed that \$7 billion be allocated for this purpose, including \$2.55 billion for highway security, \$748 million for security on passenger and freight rail systems, and \$300 million for security on public transit systems.¹¹

- *Assistance to First Responders:* As the events of September 11th demonstrated vividly, police, fire, and emergency medical personnel are the public's first line of defense in the immediate aftermath of any terrorist attack. Funding needs to be provided directly to localities so that equipment and training are provided to emergency personnel quickly and efficiently. The Administration's proposal would provide 25 percent of the available funds to state governments for further prioritization and distribution. In addition to allocating \$1.4 billion more to these critical personnel, Democratic proposals would provide all available funding directly to local governments.
- *Counterproliferation:* The Administration should not wait for a threat to show up on our shores so that a newly enhanced homeland security apparatus can respond to it; we must address the most serious threats to U.S. security before they reach us. While many agencies are embarking on nascent programs to push the threat overseas – from boardings of suspicious ships by Coast Guard Sea Marshals offshore, to INS screenings of passengers before they board an airplane – no preventive program is more important than the “Nunn-Lugar” Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs implemented by the Departments of Defense and Energy. The Administration's 2003 budget request for CTR programs is six percent lower than the level of funding provided in 2000. Additional funding must be provided to these programs, and the Defense Department should have the flexibility to allocate CTR resources to countries outside the former Soviet Union if they assess an opportunity to neutralize a threat to national security.

B. Government Reorganization: A New Department of Homeland Security

President Bush announced on June 6 that he will establish a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security that will coordinate intelligence analysis and security efforts to protect the United States, consolidating the tasks now performed by more than 100 organizations in the federal government. The Administration said the department would add no employees or expenses to the government, but would take over 169,000 employees and

¹⁰ Remarks by Rear Admiral Richard E. Bennis, USCG, Captain of the Port of New York and New Jersey, at a Symposium on Homeland Security sponsored by Congressman Joseph Crowley, LaGuardia Community College, Long Island City, New York, 26 February 2002.

¹¹ United States Security Act of 2001 (“USA Act”), H.R. 3555, Title II.

\$37.4 billion from existing agencies. Only the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans Affairs would have more employees.

The plan has four primary pillars:

1. **Border and Transportation Security:** To bring the major border security and transportation operations under one roof, the new agency will absorb, in their entirety:
 - The US Customs Service (now at Treasury)
 - The US Coast Guard (now at Transportation)
 - The new Transportation Security Agency (now at Transportation)
 - The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now at Justice)
 - The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (now at Agriculture)
 - The Federal Protective Service (the police force of the General Services Administration)
2. **Emergency Preparedness and Response:** To oversee domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response operations, the new agency will absorb:
 - The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (now an independent agency)
 - The Office of Domestic Preparedness (now at Justice)
 - The National Domestic Preparedness Office (now at FBI)
 - Specialized response assets, including:
 - The Department of Health and Human Services' Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Assets
 - The Department of Energy's Nuclear Incident Response Teams.
 - The interagency Domestic Emergency Support Team
3. **Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures:** The new agency will lead the federal government's efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction, primarily through four functions:
 - (a) Policy advice
 - (b) Planning and wargaming
 - (c) R&D and finding new applications for science and technology
 - (d) Working with state and local agencies to build their capacities to respond to terrorist incidents

To accomplish these objectives, the new agency will absorb:

- Civilian Biodefense Research Programs (now at Health and Human Services)
- The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (now at Agriculture)
- The National Biological Weapons Defense Analysis Center (a new office)

The president's proposal originally called for the new department to absorb the Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, but the White House later reversed this recommendation.

4. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection: The new Department will analyze intelligence from other agencies involving threats to homeland security and evaluate the vulnerabilities of the nation's critical infrastructure (including cyberspace). The new Department will not be a producer of intelligence, but will rather be a consumer of intelligence from CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies, charged with compiling and analyzing information related to homeland security. To accomplish these missions, the new department will absorb:
 - The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (now at Commerce)
 - The National Communications System (now at the Department of Defense)
 - The National Infrastructure Protection Center (now at FBI)
 - The Federal Computer Incident Response Center (now at GSA)
 - The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (now at Energy)

The new agency will also absorb the US Secret Service, now under Treasury, in its entirety. It will also serve as a single federal government point of contact for state and local agencies regarding warning of potential incidents, technical assistance, awarding of grants, and other issues. The White House Office of Homeland Security will continue to exist within the White House as an advisor to the president.

Analysis of the Reorganization

The president's creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security is an important step toward developing a comprehensive, efficient strategy for protecting the United States. This is why I and many other Members of Congress have recommended such a step for several months. Implementing the plan will require the Administration to address several critical issues:

- The Administration has still not presented a homeland security strategy: Though the reorganization plan is welcome, the Administration has, to some extent, put the cart before the horse. President Bush announced his reorganization before he introduced his strategy for securing the nation, a step Governor Tom Ridge is expected to take in July. Both Congress and the American people will be better able to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed restructuring if it knows how the president intends to protect the country.

- Interagency coordination: Putting these agencies under one Cabinet Secretary will hopefully help them improve their implementation of the “Three C’s” – Communication, Cooperation, and Coordination. However, combining several government agencies under one roof will not eliminate bureaucratic competition or change the tendency to hoard information – both problems that have led to intelligence and operational failures in the past. It just makes such habits an internal problem for a new agency. The new Secretary will have to make seamless cooperation a top personal priority if he wants all components of the new Department to work together effectively.
- Resources: The reorganization, as comprehensive as it is, fails to address one critical problem: government agencies need additional resources to fight terrorism effectively. The plan allocates no additional funds to address shortcomings: we need more Border Patrol agents; more equipment to screen vehicles at borders and cargo entering ports; enhancements to physical security at power plants, transportation hubs, and other critical infrastructure. It is a mistake to talk about cutting taxes further while critical homeland security missions remain underfunded. The Administration must continue to augment critical assets while the restructuring is ongoing.

The White House has also promoted the fiction that this reorganization is not going to cost any money, and it has so far refused to request an appropriation for the restructuring. Any bureaucratic restructuring costs money – people and offices must be moved, some personnel will need to be retrained, and many other tasks must be undertaken. The planned restructuring of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) alone involves the acquisition and moving of facilities, the moving of staff, and other tasks that will approach \$102 million. Plus, the new Department will be the third-largest in the government, after Defense and Veterans Affairs. This new Department is going to need a budget of its own – it can’t just exist on the budgets allocated to its components. The White House should stop pretending that this effort will be free and request that funds be appropriated to manage the job ahead.

- Coordination with local authorities: One of the most important functions of the new Department will be to serve as a single point of contact for state and local authorities – police, fire departments, first responders, and others. The reorganization puts under one roof the responsibility to coordinate federal assistance to local efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. As part of this function, the new Department must ensure that intelligence and other information is shared with local law enforcement authorities. In several town hall meetings and symposia that I have held on homeland security, law enforcement officials have said that better sharing of information by the federal government is their top requirement.

- Functions unrelated to homeland security: We must keep in mind that, according to the president's proposal, the new Department will have responsibility for a wide range of functions that have nothing to do with homeland security.
 - By absorbing the Coast Guard, for example, it would become responsible for maritime search and rescue, oil spills, and maintaining and replacing buoys.
 - By taking on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service so its expertise can be applied to agro-terrorism and threats to the nation's food supply, the new Secretary of Homeland Security will also be leading the charge to eradicate boll weevils, screwworm, mad cow disease, and a problem that has plagued New York City – the Asian Longhorned Beetle.

Just protecting the homeland will be a difficult enough job – as well as a very politically charged one. The new Department of Homeland Security – when it comes time to choose which battles to fight when arguing for funding and policy priorities – is likely to focus on homeland defense at the expense of its other responsibilities. The president's reorganization plan needs to find a way to ensure that these important functions do not get pushed aside.

- Congressional oversight: The functions that would come under the new Department are currently overseen by 88 congressional committees and subcommittees. Despite the clear challenges in developing an effective authorization, appropriation, and oversight mechanism, the president has urged Congress to pass the necessary authorizing legislation before the end of the congressional session. Certainly, Congress wants to facilitate the government's ability to combat terrorism and protect U.S. citizens, but it is also critical that the Administration's proposal be examined and considered thoroughly.

III. NEW YORK'S HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

New York is the nation's largest population center, the home of millions of people from hundreds of ethnic and national backgrounds. It is a center of national and international commerce through which millions of tourists, millions more businesspeople, and billions of dollars of goods pass through each year. It has two major airports, LaGuardia and John F. Kennedy International, as well as two train stations, Penn Station and Grand Central Station, that serve as hubs for passenger rail traffic throughout the metropolitan area, the northeast corridor, and beyond. It has several arenas – Yankee and Shea Stadiums and Madison Square Garden – at which more than 50,000 spectators must be screened. Its power plants, water facilities, medical facilities, transportation network, and other critical infrastructure must be secured. In sum, New York's homeland security requirements encompass the needs of virtually every community in the United States.

The majority of the requirements, however, fall into seven main categories: (1) law enforcement; (2) transportation security; (3) port and border security; (4) critical infrastructure protection; (5) first response and consequence management; (6) health care; and (7) recovery. An eighth category, foreign policy initiatives, captures efforts that must be launched to secure nuclear, chemical, and biological agents, as well as other initiatives designed to safeguard the United States from overseas threats.

1. Law enforcement

LAW ENFORCEMENT

SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

- Provide security clearances to local law enforcement
- Increase federal sharing of intelligence information with state and local law enforcement
- Recruit new NYPD officers
- Hire 800 NYPD civilians
- Continue federal COPS funding to hire new NYPD officers
- Extend COPS eligibility to Port Authority Police Dept. (PAPD)
- Establish State wireless network
- Establish redundant and interoperable communications networks
- Provide vehicle screening equipment to NYPD and PAPD
- Provide nuclear, biological, and chemical response training and equipment to the NYPD, PAPD, and other law enforcement agencies
- Support for regional law enforcement training center

The nation has over 645,000 sworn police officers and 186,000 deputy sheriffs, plus many thousands of other individuals with police powers – federal law enforcement agents, investigators, and others. New York State has over 60,000 officers, of which over 40,000 are in New York City alone. These brave individuals represent the first line of defense in defending the country against further terrorist attacks.

New York's police officers – the NYPD, as well as officers with the Port Authority Police Department, the New York State Police, Transit Police – need new equipment and training to meet new security challenges, and they need new doctrine to enhance communication and cooperation across jurisdictions. The City's law enforcement requirements fall into two main areas: prevention and interdiction, which is covered here, and consequence management, which is covered in section 2.

Prevention and Interdiction

Preventing terrorist attacks, securing facilities, arresting suspects, and interdicting weapons and other contraband are the most important steps in the homeland security battle, as they save the citizenry from the potentially disastrous effects of an attack. Specific initiatives

that must be undertaken to enhance law enforcement's ability to undertake these tasks include:

- (i) Increased information-sharing among federal, state, and local authorities. At a symposium on homeland security in New York's 7th Congressional District, federal, State, and City officials all agreed that improved information sharing is the single most important thing agencies could do to enhance their ability to address the terrorist threat. They stated that their difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that local agencies often provide information to federal officials as they seek federal assistance with investigations, but federal agencies rarely pass information down the chain to the local level. Measures mandating increased information-sharing have been endorsed by the International Union of Police Associations, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and the National Governors Association¹², among others.

Despite this, information-sharing receives the smallest portion of the president's homeland security budget proposal -- \$722 million, \$380 million of which would go to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's entry/exit visa system. Very little funding would remain for other agencies to improve their communications.

Among the steps that should be taken are:

- A presidential directive or legislation to require federal agencies to share information with state and local officials. Local law enforcement needs information that can be passed to the cop on the beat to help him identify potential suspects, secure threatened facilities, and take other preventative measures. Such information would include intelligence regarding potential attacks, intelligence on suspected terrorists (including photos), data from the INS watch list, and other relevant information. Intelligence sources and methods (information that indicates or would reveal how the information was collected) and other classified information that is not relevant to law enforcement could be stripped from reports to render the information less sensitive or unclassified.

The recently-passed USA Patriot Act provides for sharing of information among federal agencies, but it does not permit information to be provided by federal agencies to their local counterparts. Several pieces of legislation that would permit – but not mandate – federal agencies to share information have been introduced in the House and Senate, including the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (H.R. 3825) and the federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act (H.R. 3285 / S. 1615).

¹² Michigan Governor John Engler, Chairman, National Governors Association; Georgia Governor Roy E. Barnes; and Washington State Governor Gary Locke, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 10 April 2002.

- Provision of security clearances to local officials. There are times when the only information available about an imminent threat to homeland security is classified. In such cases, state and local governments must have enough officials with security clearances that information can be shared effectively; local officials can strip out the classified data and disseminate the threat warning more widely. In many localities, only the mayor and police chief have clearances; in other cities, no local officials do. Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating told the House Government Reform Committee that when his state's National Guard adjutant general received classified terrorism warnings, the adjutant general could not share the information with Governor Keating or with the state's public safety commissioner because they did not have the proper security clearances.¹³ Without the ability to react to the information, the information was essentially useless.

Security clearances (when granted at all) cannot simply be granted to the lead police department in a region (i.e. only the NYPD). The attacks on the World Trade Center – which was managed by the Port Authority – demonstrated that other agencies that manage and protect critical infrastructure and facilities have a need for information as well. In New York, only two Port Authority Police detectives assigned to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces have active security clearances. Security clearances should be granted as well to selected senior civilian officials at the Port Authority, including the Executive Director, the Chief Operating Officer, the Director of Operations and Emergency Management, the General Manager of Emergency Management, and the General Manager of Security Programs. If sensitive information indicated a potential threat to New York's ports, airports, bus stations, bridges, tunnels, and other key facilities managed by the Port Authority, these officials must have the ability to receive all available information from the federal government.

Each state governor (or each state's homeland security director) should have the ability to designate state and municipal officials who require security clearances. The provision of security clearances to selected local officials has been endorsed by the United States Conference of Mayors¹⁴ and the National Governors Association¹⁵ and was proposed by Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley to the Senate Judiciary Committee.¹⁶ The Office of Homeland Security must work with federal intelligence agencies to

¹³ Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 12 March 2002.

¹⁴ United States Conference of Mayors, "A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities," December 2001, p. 15.

¹⁵ National Governors Association, National Security and Homeland Security Policy (HR-10), Winter 2002.

¹⁶ Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley, Hearing on "Homeland Defense: Sharing Information With Local Law Enforcement," Testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, December 11, 2001.

determine a mechanism for expeditiously conducting investigations on officials nominated by the governors to receive security clearances.

The Office of Homeland Security's intelligence sharing initiative provides \$90 million in 2003 to ensure continuous communications among federal, state, and local officials during a crisis.¹⁷ To truly facilitate open communications, and to ensure that relevant intelligence information is quickly disseminated to the state and local level when appropriate, the Department of Homeland Security's intelligence center should disseminate intelligence to state and local officials on a need-to-know basis.¹⁸ The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, an expert group established by Congress in 1998 (P.L. 105-261), also endorsed the need to share terrorism-related intelligence and threat assessments with state and local officials.¹⁹ The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials has also recommended that senior public health staff members have sufficient security clearance to be involved in law enforcement activities and briefings.²⁰

- Creation of "Law Enforcement Sensitive" classification. The Administration should adopt the National Sheriff's Association proposal that a new security classification, "law enforcement sensitive," be added to the current set of "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" designations. Information classified as "law enforcement sensitive" would be kept from the public but stripped of information that could compromise national security.²¹ Such information could then be shared with state and local law enforcement officials through networks like the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System or the Regional Information Sharing System. The establishment of a "law enforcement sensitive" classification would greatly facilitate the sharing of intelligence information with state and local law enforcement by alleviating the need

¹⁷ Peter Verga, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, 5 March 2002.

¹⁸ Edwin Meese III, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 12 March 2002. See also Daniel W. Fisk, Working Group Rapporteur, *Defending the American Homeland, Top Priorities for Improving Intelligence and Law Enforcement, A Report of the Working Group on Intelligence and Law Enforcement*, The Heritage Foundation, 8 January 2002.

¹⁹ James S. Gilmore, III, Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, 5 March 2002.

²⁰ Association of State and Territorial Health Officials web site (www.astho.org).

²¹ Sheriff John Cary Bittick, President, National Sheriff's Association, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 4 June 2002.

to provide security clearances to a large number of law enforcement officials.

- Local access to federal databases. Local law enforcement must have greater access to databases maintained by federal agencies, including the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and INS watch list.²² These federal agencies need funding to make their databases more accessible to other agencies, and the state and local agencies need funding to purchase computer equipment and establish a connection to the network.

Attorney General Ashcroft took an important step toward enhancing federal-state-local information sharing on April 11, when he instructed federal agencies to share information on terrorists in federal databases, obtain fingerprints and other information on suspected terrorists from other agencies, and give state and local law enforcement agencies access to secure data over a web-based system.²³ The Justice Department should consider whether additional similar measures to enhance information-sharing can be undertaken.

- Developing mechanisms for information-sharing between state and local authorities. New York State has developed a statewide wireless network that will enable state and local law enforcement agencies throughout New York to share real-time information. The system received \$24 million in federal funds from the fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental appropriation, and similar levels of funding should be provided for this critical initiative in fiscal year 2003.
- Continue to make use of joint task forces and personnel exchanges. Dozens of task forces and committees have been formed to ensure that federal, state, and local authorities are aware of each others' actions. Officials should continue to rely on such entities and establish new ones where appropriate. Additionally, personnel from law enforcement agencies should be detailed to others in order to get a better sense of how counterparts in different jurisdictions work and to overcome the obstacles posed by jurisdictional boundaries.

- (ii) Provide vehicle screening equipment to agencies. Among the most critical threats to New York's security is the prospect that a terrorist would smuggle a nuclear, chemical, or biological device, or even a massive conventional explosive, into the City. Law enforcement agencies need to acquire sensors, x-rays, and other equipment that can detect such substances and deploy them to the bridges, tunnels, and other chokepoints that control access to the City.

²² United States Conference of Mayors, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities*, December 2001, p. 16.

²³ William Matthews, "Ashcroft Orders More Info Sharing," *Federal Computer Week*, 15 April 2002.

Vehicle screening equipment sufficient to outfit four special Highway Interdictions Teams as proposed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey would be approximately \$5 million.

- A single mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), which is currently used by the U.S. Customs Service) is about \$1 million per vehicle.
- Additional equipment would cost about \$1 million, or \$250,000 per team. Requirements include ion scanning machines for explosives, detectors for hazardous industrial chemicals, radiation measuring instruments, squad vehicles, personal protective equipment, and communications and computer gear.

- (iii) Enhance recruitment of law enforcement officers. Redeployment measures and forced overtime, however, are not sustainable in the long term. Additional funds must be provided to hire new recruits. The NYPD, which currently has 37,000 officers despite its authorized end strength of 39,000 officers, is working to recruit an additional 1,500 officers to enable both homeland security and everyday law enforcement functions to be provided even as the department loses officers to attrition, retirement, and other law enforcement agencies that are providing large recruitment incentives in the wake of September 11.

Unfortunately, declining City revenues has meant that the City's overall 2003 budget may need to be cut. If so, individual City agencies will need to cut programs. The \$76 million the NYPD would lose from its budget would require the Department to forgo hiring 1,300 additional officers in 2003 and delay the next graduating class of 2,000 officers from July 2002 to January 2003 (initiatives that would cost \$63.2 million). The City should make every effort to ensure that the overall budget does not affect the critical services offered by the NYPD, though the State and federal governments should also be prepared to step in and provide assistance if necessary.

- (iv) Hire civilians to free up cops to walk a beat. Law enforcement agencies should hire civilians to perform office functions so uniformed officers serving in desk jobs can once again walk a beat. New homeland security missions have diverted police officers and other emergency services personnel away from their core missions. Requirements have been met in recent months by requiring officers to work overtime and by redeploying specialized units in more quotidian roles. Immediately after September 11, Governor Pataki ordered the reassignment of nearly 700 members of the State Police to anti-terrorist duties. Troopers, Investigators, Canine Units, Mobile Response Teams, Divers, and Aviation and Marine Units all worked twelve-hour shifts. Personnel requirements were so high that Governor Pataki issued an Executive Order allowing State Police officers who retired after December 30, 1998 to return to

duty and allow current Troopers who reach the mandatory retirement age of 57 to continue serving.

The NYPD plans to hire 800 additional civilians to free up uniformed officers for law enforcement duties. The plan would not only add the number of cops walking a beat, but using civilians for administrative tasks would also save the City \$15.2 million annually.²⁴ This hiring plan will also have to be canceled, however, if the City's overall 2003 budget falls short.

(v) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program:

(a) Continued federal funding of NYPD salaries through the Justice Department's COPS Program. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 created a grant program, referred to as Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), which gives the Department of Justice the power to make grants to local governments "to increase police presence, to expand and improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the community to address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise to enhance public safety". Under the program, COPS funds \$25,000 per year of an officer's salary over the three year period of the grant, with the City required to pay the balance during the first three years and the full salary for one full City funding cycle following the three-year grant period.

To date, the COPS program has allowed the NYPD to put more than 4,000 new officers on the beat through \$300 million in federal funding. The result of this program is noticed in every neighborhood across the City – lower crime, a new pride in New York, and the restored image of New York as the capital of the world. New York State overall has hired 11,768 law enforcement officers through more than \$783 million in COPS grants since 1994.

The NYPD is in jeopardy of losing COPS funding for Fiscal 2003 and Fiscal 2004. Due to a slower hiring pace by the NYPD over the past several years, program assumptions by the Justice Department are that federal COPS funds are being used to supplant – as opposed to supplement – City funding for the hiring of new officers. This is not the case. In fact, the City continues to use its own funds to hire and train new officers, as well as provide new training to the current officers of the New York Police Department. Additionally, the City is spending its own resources to increase police protection throughout the City in light of the City's continued crusade against terrorism.

²⁴ New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson, Jr., "NYPD Could Save \$15.2 Million by Civilianizing Ranks," Press Release PR02-06-037, 3 June 2002.

The NYPD is bearing huge additional costs to combat terrorism while continuing to increase police presence in communities and control crime. The City has requested a waiver that will permit it to continue to receive federal funding under the COPS program. The Department of Justice should approve the City's waiver request.

- (b) Modify COPS program to fund law enforcement agencies with homeland security roles. The COPS program should be redefined to explicitly include agencies conducting homeland security related roles. The Port Authority Police Department, which is not currently eligible for COPS program funding, plays a crucial role in protecting New York City's infrastructure and should be able to request funding from this program.

Port Authority Police protect major transportation, trade and commerce facilities in the New York metropolitan region. These facilities are among the busiest in the nation and are critical pieces of public infrastructure, fundamental to the region's economy and quality of life, generating income and jobs for its businesses and residents. Its facilities have been the targets of terrorism before – it managed the World Trade Center when it was attacked in 1993, as well as when it was destroyed on September 11th, and terrorist plots to attack the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels later that same year were foiled by aggressive law enforcement investigation. A terrorist attack using WMD on any one of its more significant facilities could have enormous impacts on the regional and U.S. population, and on the local and national economies, with reverberations surpassing even those of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has, on more than one occasion, experienced the horror of terrorism first hand. The agency lost 75 staff among the over 3,000 that perished on September 11, 2001. Of the 75 agency personnel killed, most were engaged in the initial rescue operation. Of these, 37 were Port Authority Police Officers – the largest single loss of life by any police agency in U.S. history. There is no police organization anywhere in the country more committed to avert and, if needed, respond to any future such event. This force must be supported and reinforced. Amendment or expansion of the COPS program and Port Authority eligibility is one way to accomplish this.

- (vi) Create a regional law enforcement training center. To be fully interoperable, law enforcement agencies from different jurisdictions must be familiar with each other's doctrine and capabilities. The NYPD has already created a regional training center that would enable officers from throughout the New York area to learn to operate together by training together.²⁵ The costs of

²⁵ Remarks by Assistant Chief Joanne Jaffe, New York Police Department, at a Symposium on Homeland Security sponsored by Congressman Joseph Crowley, LaGuardia Community College, Long Island City, New York, 26 February 2002.

developing and implementing a curriculum to cover counter-terrorism training will be quite high, however, making this valuable initiative worthy of federal support.

2. First Response and Consequence Management

FIRST RESPONSE AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

- Provide wide range of equipment to firefighters and other first responders to enhance their ability to respond to disasters and attacks involving nuclear, biological, and chemical devices
- Augment federal assistance to FDNY to cover counter-terrorism training and replace lost vehicles and equipment
- Allocate federal funds to reimburse City for first responder overtime, including \$104 million in overtime costs incurred by the FDNY
- Pass State and City pension bills to promote retention of experienced first responders
- Computerize database showing locations and contents of hazardous materials storage facilities and pipelines
- Provide funds directly to local authorities
- Fund first responder interoperability, including redundant and interoperable communications networks
- Allocate federal funds for development of NY State Wireless Network
- Assign communications priority to first responders
- Train teachers, school administrators, hospitals, and community groups in disaster response
- Participate fully in Citizen Corps, including Community Emergency Response Team training, Volunteers in Police Service, and Medical Reserve Corps

Consequence management efforts can be divided into two primary areas: programs focused on first responders, and programs focused on the community.

A. Programs for First Responders

While law enforcement officers will be among the first to arrive at the scene of a disaster, other emergency personnel – including the country’s more than 1 million firefighters and 870,000 emergency medical service providers (EMTs, paramedics, and EMS first responders) – will also rush into the chaos in an attempt to rescue victims. While new training needs must be evaluated, the NYPD, FDNY, and other agencies with emergency services assets in New York have been training for such incidents, including those involving weapons of mass destruction, for some time. As a result, the NYPD and FDNY have specialized HazMat units in each borough; high-rise rescue plans are already in place in specialized units in both the NYPD and FDNY; and officers throughout the City have received training to enhance their ability to prevent and respond to terrorism.

These first responders have a wide range of requirements, including protective gear, interoperable communications equipment, and training for nuclear, biological, and chemical contingencies. Where new doctrine must be developed, particularly in areas where emergency personnel from several departments or jurisdictions must work together at an incident scene, training provided by a regional training center (see above) will be critical.²⁶

Even FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness asserts that most first responders, however, are not equipped to deal with the mass casualties and possible chemical or biological contamination associated with a terrorist attack.²⁷ As a result, many measures need to be taken to enhance the ability of first responders to do their jobs during a contingency. They include:

- (i) *Provide first responders with a wide range of equipment.* The president’s 2003 homeland security proposal recommends \$3.5 billion for first responders, including programs to improve communications infrastructure, personal protective equipment, biological and chemical detection gear, training, and other items needed by police, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and others who are likely to be the first to arrive at the scene of an attack. The list of items that are required by the NYPD, FDNY, Port Authority Police Department, and other emergency services agencies is extensive: gas masks, self-contained breathing devices, protective clothing, decontamination equipment, containment devices, explosion mitigation devices, chemical and biological detection equipment, specialized vehicles to transport personnel and equipment into and through contaminated areas, and many more.²⁸

²⁶ Remarks by Assistant Chief Joanne Jaffe, New York Police Department, at a Symposium on Homeland Security sponsored by Congressman Joseph Crowley, LaGuardia Community College, Long Island City, New York, 26 February 2002.

²⁷ Bruce Baughman, Director of FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, March 5, 2002.

²⁸ Washington, DC, Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, 5 March 2002.

Equipment needs fall into several categories:

- Equipment and Vehicles Destroyed on September 11th: FEMA is providing funds to replace much of the equipment that was destroyed in the attacks on the World Trade Center. It is reimbursing the Fire Department for approximately \$28 million worth of equipment, \$33 million worth of vehicles, and approximately \$2 million worth of communications gear.
- Communications Gear: The Fire Department alone has identified at least \$186 million worth of communications requirements, including:
 - An emergency “mayday” button on firefighter portable radios (\$2 million)
 - A fiber-based wide area network (WAN) to provide for high-speed, dependable, and redundant delivery of information among command posts, and firehouses, and other facilities (\$50 million)
 - Wireless command posts so multiple personnel can monitor on-scene information to track responding units and Haz-Mat and building information (\$44 million)
 - Wireless firefighting tracking system to track firefighters as they move within buildings (\$5 million)
 - Wireless firefighter accountability check-in system in order to identify all firefighters at the scene of an incident (\$5 million)
 - Wireless firefighting bio-medical system that allows for monitoring body vital statistics as they operate at the scene of emergencies. Gives commanders the information to pull responders from a scene when they are in medical jeopardy (\$10 million)
 - Wireless access to a building’s information systems as firefighting units arrive on scene (\$3 million)
 - Transmission of on-scene video to command posts and other remote locations (\$4 million)
 - Installation of in-building signal repeaters in buildings over 20 stories tall to enhance radio signals (\$60 million)
- Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Protective Gear. Though New York City’s first responders have trained for nuclear, biological, and chemical incidents for years, not all public safety officers have been issued protective gear or trained in how to use it. First responders in many localities

throughout the country have even less familiarity with such equipment. Given federal agencies' greater familiarity with NBC equipment, federal assistance in defining equipment standards and capabilities would greatly facilitate the effort by several regional agencies to agree upon and adopt a compatible equipment.²⁹ Acquired gear should be interoperable with other agencies' equipment to the maximum extent possible, a need that requires public safety agencies from the City and State to coordinate with each other when evaluating and procuring equipment.

- *Rapid Response Vehicles* -- The FDNY is in the process of enhancing its fleet with 50 new rapid response vehicles which can be quickly deployed throughout the City to emergency situations involving hazardous materials (e.g., anthrax and other biochemical weapons of mass destruction) with specialized equipment, tools, and supplies. The cost of the 50 vehicles and associated equipment is \$34.6 million.
- *Chemical Detection and Protective Devices*: The FDNY requires \$1.7 million worth of radiation and chemical detectors and specialized protective equipment to enhance its ability to respond to attacks by weapons of mass destruction.
- *Equipment for HazMat and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Operations*: To purchase air purified respirators, radiation detector pagers, and specialized equipment for EMS personnel, ambulances, and Haz-Tec units, the FDNY has identified \$2.6 million in requirements that are currently unmet.

The Port Authority envisions the creation of a specialized Hazardous Materials/Hazardous Devices response capability provided by four integrated teams containing both HazMat and Bomb Squad personnel. Equipment for these teams would cost about \$1.5 million each, for a total of \$6 million.

- *Emergency Mobilization Supplies and Vehicles*: The Fire Department will establish and maintain a \$15 million emergency reserve of equipment, supplies and other materials that will be used to replenish operating units in the event of a major emergency or catastrophe. It will be capable of replenishing twenty percent of operating units. The Department is also seeking to purchase \$21 million worth of vehicles that will enable it to respond to disaster sites while maintaining a readiness to provide emergency coverage for the remainder of the City.
- *Incident Command Posts*: The FDNY is seeking \$3.5 million to establish nine command posts. In the event of a major disaster or emergency, six

²⁹ Washington, DC, Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, 5 March 2002.

fully equipped units will serve as incident command posts within each borough and three will serve as mobile command posts.

- Boats: The Fire Department is currently building two small fireboats at a cost of \$13 million. A third, larger boat is being considered that will cost \$15 million to construct. The Port Authority Police Department needs four patrol boats (at a cost of \$1 million each) for emergency search and rescue operations and for surveillance and protection of port facilities, tunnel vent structures, bridge piers, and the water approaches at LaGuardia and Kennedy Airports. Current Port Authority craft are inadequate for these tasks and are unusable in inclement weather.
- Helicopters: In April 2002, the NYPD received a grant for \$9.8 million from the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Enhancement Program (LEEP) to purchase an additional helicopter designed to enhance the capabilities of the NYPD Counter-Terrorism Task Force and the joint NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. New York officials should aggressively apply for available funding to meet similar requirements, and the Justice Department and other federal agencies should make New York, whose law enforcement and first response capabilities are still recovering from the devastating effects of September 11, a top priority.

Port Authority Police possess a smaller aviation unit, though its one aircraft is not suitable for the sort of missions agency special operations personnel may have to conduct in a counter-terrorism scenario. This aircraft should be either augmented with or replaced by an aircraft specially suited for the sort of multi-mission role required by a terrorist attack or other contingency. The Port Authority should apply to the LEEP program for funding for such an aircraft, and the Department of Justice should give this request its full consideration.

The FDNY is currently examining the feasibility of helicopters to survey high-rise fires in congested areas. The Department is analyzing the total costs, which include both the capital outlay and significant recurring maintenance, training, personnel and fuel costs.

- (ii) Train all first responders in nuclear, biological, and chemical consequence management. All City first responders should receive training in how to manage a WMD incident. The NYPD and FDNY already have emergency response teams trained in hazmat and WMD response, and they continue to enhance the training provided to specialized units and others on the force to focus on potential terrorist incidents. More than 11,400 firefighters have received basic counter-terrorism training since September 11th, attending a course that was developed in conjunction with the Department of Justice. Specialized training should be provided by the Justice Department to police forces in New York and around the country so law enforcement agencies

receive critical training that is unique to their mission. The FDNY has identified \$74 million in training requirements for 2002 and 2003, and it is currently developing a long-range training plan that will prepare firefighters to utilize new technologies and address newly identified threats.

The Port Authority plans for a Police Special Operations Division that would include up to four Hazardous Devices/Chemical Incident Response Teams geographically deployed at key agency facilities across the Port District. Approximately 50 personnel would be trained, with training to be provided at no cost by the Department of Justice. Similar training should be provided at no cost to other NYC-area law enforcement agencies. (Equipment costs for these teams would be approximately \$6 million.)

- (iii) Augment assistance to firefighters. Firefighters will be called upon in a mass casualty incident to not only fight fires, but also to contain chemical and biological agents, assess the safety of damaged buildings, and evacuate the injured. A wide range of equipment and training is needed to provide these capabilities. In addition, the FDNY has already spent \$33M to replace vehicles and \$28M to replace equipment damaged or destroyed on September 11, all of which has been or will be reimbursed by FEMA.

A number of programs are required to assist the FDNY, including:

- Increased funding for the Assistance to Firefighters program. The Assistance to Firefighters Program, operated by FEMA's U.S. Fire Administration, provided federal assistance for fire operations, firefighter safety, vehicles, emergency medical services, and fire prevention programs. In 2001, Congress appropriated \$100 million for the Assistance to Firefighters program, but FEMA received 20,000 applications for assistance totaling \$3 billion. This year, \$360 million in grants is available, though FEMA received 19,500 applications for requests totaling \$2.2 billion.³⁰

The FDNY alone has requested \$261 million for training and equipment, including \$100 million in applications to a Citywide Hazard Mitigation Grants Program. The International Association of Fire Chiefs has called for authorization of this program at \$1 billion per year for five years (FY2003-2007), a level of funding which should be supported.³¹

³⁰ U.S. Fire Administration, "Over 19,500 Applications Received for Firefighters Grant Program," press release 02-034, 15 April 2002.

³¹ International Association of Fire Chiefs, *Providing for the Common Defense: Requirements for the Nation's Fire Service for Homeland Security*, p.6

HIGHLIGHTS OF FDNY REQUIREMENTS	
Unreimbursed overtime	\$104 million
Counter-terrorism training	\$74 million
New and replacement vehicles	\$86 million
New and replacement equipment (other than vehicles)	\$49 million
Communications equipment	\$186 million
NYC Hazard mitigation grants	\$100 million

- (iv) Reimburse overtime for first responders. An enormous portion of the homeland security expenses borne by local communities since September 11th has been the incursion of overtime costs for police officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and construction workers clearing debris at Ground Zero and the Pentagon. The FDNY alone incurred \$104 million in overtime expenditures between September 11 and June 1, 2002. Cities nationwide estimate that they spent 43 percent of additional security funds in overtime in 2001 and will use 23 percent of federal funds to pay for overtime in 2002.³² Immediately after September 11, Governor Pataki reassigned 700 State Police officers to anti-terrorist duties and required all to work twelve-hour shifts.

Federal proposals would permit homeland security grants to be used for overtime costs in the future, but no provisions are made for the reimbursement of overtime costs already incurred. New York City is currently seeking \$52 million from FEMA to cover non-reimbursed overtime expenses related to the September 11th attacks. Though negotiations are still ongoing, FEMA should provide the funds so New York's first responders can continue to provide emergency services to the residents of New York.

- (v) Pass pension bills that promote retention of police officers and firefighters. The laws currently governing police and firefighter pensions encourage public safety officers to retire soon after their most lucrative year. Given the amount of overtime paid out by the NYPD and FDNY since September 11, many of the City's most experienced police officers and firefighters, as well as New York State's most experienced Troopers, have an enormous financial incentive to leave the force at a pension that is much more generous than if they stayed on the force for several more years. The FDNY expects 850 members to retire this year, compared with 300 in an average year.

The New York State Legislature is considering bills (S. 6473-B and A. 10407-B) that would remove the financial penalty to police officers and firefighters for continuing to serve the public. The City Council should expeditiously pass the

³² U.S. Conference Of Mayors, *The Cost of Heightened Security in America's Cities: A 192-City Survey*, January 2002.

home rule bill that would permit the State laws to regulate City agencies, and the State Legislature in Albany should act swiftly to pass its legislation before our community loses the expertise of these dedicated public servants. The cost to the City would be \$9 million, a cost far lower than the pension fund liabilities that would be generated if these public safety officers were to retire. A similar bill is being considered to provide the same retention incentives to State Troopers.

- (vi) Computerize list of hazardous materials storage: In New York City alone, there are over 25,000 storage tanks for petroleum and hazardous chemicals. Many of these tanks are located out of sight, inside or under high-rise buildings. Firefighters and other first responders cannot easily access information on the locations or contents of these storage facilities, meaning rescue workers often enter burning or damaged buildings unaware of the potential threats that lie inside. The City Council should pass a bill, initiative number 47, that would require the City Department of Environmental Protection to establish a computerized database of all storage tanks and pipelines that hold potentially hazardous materials.³³ Given the heavy population density and critical economic importance of many of the affected areas, federal funds should be provided to expedite and facilitate the effort.

- (vii) Give funds directly to the cities. The Administration recommends giving 70 percent of first responder funds to localities and 30 percent to states for further distribution. More funds should go directly to local officials to ensure that money is used for training and equipment rather than for program management and bureaucratic oversight.

- (viii) Support first responder interoperability. FEMA's First Responder Initiative, which would receive \$3.5 billion under the president's 2003 budget proposal, would help foster mutual aid arrangements within states and between and among states so that state, local, federal, and volunteer networks can operate together seamlessly. The effort will focus on resource typing for teams, accreditation of individuals using standardized certifications and qualifications, and equipment and communications interoperability. The funds would be distributed roughly as follows:
 - Equipment: \$2.0 billion
 - Training: \$1.1 billion
 - Exercises: \$245 million
 - Planning: \$105 million

³³ Mary Ellen Kris, Regional Director, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Testimony before the New York City Council Committee on Environmental Protection, 7 June 2002.

FEMA's First Responder Initiative is an extraordinarily important initiative that should be funded in future annual budgets as well. FEMA anticipates that similar levels of funding will be made available each year through 2007.

- (ix) Assign communications priority to first responders. Many Americans found that they had trouble getting telephone calls through on September 11, as unprecedented demand and damage to critical phone infrastructure reduced the number of circuits available. We cannot permit first responders and other emergency workers to face the same communications obstacles. The FCC should conduct a study of the communications problems encountered by emergency officials in New York on September 11th, and it must take steps to provide protected radio and telephone spectrums for emergency workers.
- (x) Deploy redundant and interoperable communications networks. A significant investment must be made in communications equipment that permits law enforcement, fire department, and emergency services personnel from jurisdictions around the City to communicate with each other. To ensure that communications does not fail during a crisis, redundancy must be built in to these interagency networks.

The New York City Fire Department announced in early June that it would spend \$14 million on a new high-frequency radio system that can penetrate concrete and steel better than the systems in use on September 11. The hand-held Motorola radios will be augmented by antennas in subway tunnels and by repeaters in 60 high-rise buildings, permitting reliable radio communications in locations where communications were spotty before. The radios can be programmed to operate on a wide range of frequencies, thereby preventing channels from becoming overloaded during a large-scale incident. Most importantly, the radios are interoperable with communications networks used by the NYPD, Office of Emergency Management, and other City agencies.³⁴

The FDNY is also evaluating the utility of in-building signal repeaters to enhance the signals generated by radios in buildings over 20 stories tall. The installation of such devices is expected to cost in the neighborhood of \$60 million.

The Port Authority also plans to spend \$42 million to upgrade its police, security and emergency management communications.

New communications networks should have the following features:

1. Greater resilience, so the network can remain operational in the event of a major catastrophic event or other emergency;
2. Increased capacity to accommodate all public safety and operations users;

³⁴ Michael Weissenstein, "N.Y. Fire Dept. Revamps Radio System," Associated Press, 3 June 2002.

3. Improved integration within and among law enforcement and emergency management agencies;
 4. Enhanced interoperability among public safety organizations at the local, state and federal levels;
 5. Separate channels and priority access for police and emergency management communications; and
 6. Enhanced system security against “eavesdropping” or deliberate disruption.
- (xi) Develop New York State Wireless Communications Network. The Justice Department received \$60 million to develop a federal law enforcement radio infrastructure for key areas such as New York.³⁵ New York State is developing and implementing a State-wide wireless network that will enable first responders and law enforcement officers in the State’s 543 police departments to share real-time information with their counterparts in other jurisdictions throughout the State. The 2002 emergency supplemental appropriations bill provided New York State with \$24 million to support this network, and a similar amount should be provided this year to enable the State to continue its work on this critical communications network, which will cost an estimated \$400 million to complete.

B. Programs for the Community

The community must also play a role in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. Training must be provided to community groups, schools, and other institutions so community leaders and citizens know how to react in case disaster strikes. Ordinary citizens can contribute directly to response efforts as well through a wide range of volunteer programs.

- (i) Provide training in disaster response for teachers, school administrators, hospitals, and community groups. As September 11th demonstrated, terrorists are likely to strike during the business day in order to increase casualties and maximize fear and confusion. In the wake of a terrorist attack, many people will seek the perceived safety of their homes; many workers will leave their offices; and many parents will pick their children up at school early. Hospitals may move patients to safer locations. Just as the federal government developed procedures to follow in case of nuclear attack during the Cold War, FEMA should develop basic training materials for school and hospital administrators, teachers, office managers, and other community leaders to teach them how to manage their facilities during a crisis. Some of this is being done through the newly created Citizens Corps, including FEMA’s Citizen’s Emergency Response Team (CERT) program (see below).

³⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Requests \$30.2 Billion to Prevent and Combat Terrorism, Continue the Fight Against Drugs, Ensure Civil Rights,” press release, 4 February 2002.

Such federal training must include tips for developing a crisis plan and informing communities what to do when a disaster strikes; after the collapse of the World Trade Center, some parents tried to pick up their children at a school just blocks from Ground Zero, putting themselves in harm's way only to find that the children had already been evacuated. Such situations can be avoided by developing a contingency plan in advance and communicating its guidelines effectively.

(ii) Enhance Citizens Corps and the development of volunteer networks.

– Citizen Corps. New York City should participate fully in programs administered by the newly established Citizens Corps, to be coordinated by FEMA, especially:

✓ Community Emergency Response Team (CERT), an 18-hour training program that prepares people in neighborhoods, the workplace, and schools to take a more active role in emergency management planning and to prepare themselves and others for disasters. Participants learn how to give critical support to first responders in emergencies, provide immediate assistance to victims, organize spontaneous volunteers at a disaster site, and collect disaster information to support first responder efforts. CERT programs rely exclusively on state and private funding, however, thereby limiting the number of people that can participate to about 400,000 people nationwide over the next two years. Federal funds should be provided to enable more communities to train their citizens in emergency procedures.

✓ Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), a Justice Department program that makes use of community volunteers to free up law enforcement officers for front-line work. Local authorities participating in the program use volunteers to, among other things, take police reports, make follow-up phone calls to victims, conduct fingerprinting, assist with Neighborhood Watch Programs, engage in crowd and parking control at special events, act as crossing guards, run metal detectors at courthouses and other facilities, teach crime prevention, and perform clerical tasks.

The program should also be expanded to help communities establish a database of retired law enforcement officers, military police reservists, and others with law enforcement backgrounds who live in the region and whose experience can be drawn on quickly in a contingency. The program should also include firefighters and other emergency workers with valuable skills that would be required in a crisis.

✓ Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), a program to be administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to enable retired healthcare professionals to effectively augment local health officials'

capacity to respond to an emergency. Legislation may be required to ensure that MRC volunteers, many of whom will no longer possess valid professional licenses or carry appropriate insurance, can offer their services without undue fears of legal liability. Even in the absence of a crisis situation, medical reservists can play a productive role in meeting pressing but non-emergency public health needs in their communities.

- Neighborhood Watch Programs. Citizens know their neighborhoods. As a result, NYPD officials assert, local communities have the potential to provide extremely valuable information to law enforcement agencies.³⁶ The Justice Department's \$800 million Justice Assistance Grant Program includes \$15 million to facilitate neighborhood watch programs' terrorism preparedness.³⁷ On March 6, Attorney General Ashcroft announced a grant of \$1.9 million to the National Sheriff's Association to work with communities around the country to double the number of National Neighborhood Watch programs over the next two years. These two sources of funds will greatly augment community involvement, but the levels of funding are inadequate to make a serious impact. Future annual budgets should also include funds to create and support neighborhood watch programs.

³⁶ Remarks by Assistant Chief Joanne Jaffe, New York Police Department, at a Symposium on Homeland Security sponsored by Congressman Joseph Crowley, LaGuardia Community College, Long Island City, New York, 26 February 2002.

³⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, "Department of Justice Requests \$30.2 Billion to Prevent and Combat Terrorism, Continue the Fight Against Drugs, Ensure Civil Rights," press release, 4 February 2002.

3. Transportation Security

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

A. Airports

- Enhance security of key airport infrastructure (i.e. fuel tanks, runways, etc.)
- Conduct background investigations of more airport employees
- Fund additional airport security personnel and equipment
- Continue training for airport security personnel

B. Bridges and Tunnels

- Conduct vulnerability assessments and establish federal security guidelines for bridges and tunnels
- Screen vehicles at bridge and tunnel entrances
- Improve means of monitoring traffic and communicating with motorists

A. Public Transportation

- Establish back-up rail operations center
- Improve announcement capabilities in subway and rail stations
- Improve access to secure areas by employees
- Improve physical security at bus depots and facilities

B. Rail System

- Improve security of tracks and depots
- Implement passenger and baggage screening
- Upgrade rail infrastructure

C. Inter-City Bus Network

- Enhance physical security at bus terminals
- Implement passenger and baggage screening
- Hire additional police and security personnel

D. Other

- Place chemical and radiological detectors in airport terminals, subway stations, and rail and bus terminals

Freedom to travel around the country to sightsee and to visit friends and family is a hallmark of modern American life. The economy is dependent on the timely movement of goods by road, rail, and air. Attacks upon the transportation infrastructure of a densely populated commercial hub like New York could have devastating effects on the American economy as well as the sense of freedom that all Americans enjoy. If the transportation system is disrupted, rescue workers' efforts to reach victims will be hindered, civilians fleeing the scene of a disaster will face obstacles, and goods will be stuck in ports and warehouses.

Perhaps our greatest transportation vulnerability is that fuel will be stranded in ports and other storage facilities if it cannot be shipped by road, rail, and sea. The Port of New York and New Jersey handles more petroleum (3 billion tons per year) than any other American port; when it closed on September 11, airports and fuel suppliers throughout the northeastern United States immediately began calling to find out when the port would resume operations, as the entire region relies on fuel shipments that pass through it.

Though the president's homeland security budget proposal establishes a range of additional aviation security measures, it includes virtually no additional funds for other elements of transportation security. Funding is required to enhance security at train and bus stations, along critical rail lines, at bridges and tunnels, and at other facilities that are critical to the nation's transportation infrastructure. Many House members, recognizing the critical importance of transportation security, have supported a proposal to allocate \$7.2 billion for this purpose, including \$2.55 billion for highway security, \$748 million for security on passenger and freight rail systems, and \$300 million for security on public transit systems.

Since the September 11th terrorists used commercial passenger airplanes as cruise missiles to attack American landmarks, aviation security quite naturally received a great deal of immediate attention. Nearly 14,000 members of the New York State National Guard were deployed between September 11 and May 31, 2002, when the Guard ended its airport security functions.³⁸ However, other transportation facilities need to be protected as well. Traffic flow must move efficiently to permit rescuers to travel to a disaster scene and to permit civilians to leave the area, as well as to prevent the economy from being tied up by delays to truck-borne cargo. Rail systems must be protected, both to safeguard passengers and to permit the free flow of goods by rail. Bus terminals, bridges, and tunnels must all be made more secure. Security measures must be implemented to address all modes of transportation, including aviation security, city streets, interstate highways, public transportation, rail networks, and inter-city bus networks.

- A. Aviation Security: Congress and the Administration have worked together to implement a wide variety of measures to improve security at airports and on-board aircraft. The landmark Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-

³⁸ Major General Thomas P. Maguire, Jr., Adjutant General of the State of New York, State of New York Executive Chamber press release, "Governor Praises National Guard for Airport Security Duty," 9 May 2002.

71) federalized passenger screeners through the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration, mandated cockpit security measures and federal air marshals on every flight, and made airports eligible to receive funds to improve facilities and purchase screening equipment. The process of implementing the wide range of new security measures required is ongoing.

However, other, lower-profile steps need to be taken to enhance security as well.

- (i) Enhance security at key airport infrastructure. LaGuardia Airport, the smallest of the three airports that serve New York City, stores as much as 4,750,000 gallons of jet fuel in tanks throughout the facility. Such tanks need additional measures in place to ensure their security. The lives of passengers, airport employees, and members of the neighboring community are at risk if these highly explosive tanks were to be the target of an attack.
- (ii) Conduct background investigations on more airport employees. Governor George E. Pataki took an important step towards implementing enhanced airport security measures on April 12, when he introduced legislation to require background investigations for any employee working beyond the security check point on an airport passenger concourse. New Jersey Governor James McGreevey has also indicated his support for the legislation, which must be approved by both states to take effect at the New York City area airports operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
- (iii) Fund additional airport security personnel and equipment. Further funding will be needed to ensure that airport security staffs have adequate numbers of personnel and sufficient equipment to conduct thorough screenings. The Port Authority has already taken steps to make LaGuardia Airport “a model for security,” in the words of former New York State Homeland Security Director James Kallstrom. Barriers will be established to prevent unauthorized trucks from driving onto the tarmac, fencing and high-density lighting will be installed, and members of the Port Authority Police Department and NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force will receive training and equipment to handle biological and chemical weapons.³⁹

Under the new Aviation Security law, airports could request a waiver from the requirement that employees of the new federal Transportation Security Authority man security posts. To prevent private firms with shoddy records from providing security at high-traffic airports, heavily used airports like John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark should not be permitted to seek waivers.

- (iv) Continue training for airport security personnel. In addition to technical training to provide security skills, thorough training must be given to airport personnel to ensure they have the skills to conduct effective security checks while still respecting the civil rights and dignity of passengers.

³⁹ Liz Goff, “Turning LaGuardia Airport Into Model of Security,” *Queens Tribune*, 12-18 April 2002, p. 16.

B. Roads and Highways

- (i) Conduct vulnerability assessments for bridges and tunnels. The City's seven bridges and two tunnels, which together carry 867,000 vehicles per day, or over 300 million vehicles annually,⁴⁰ represent high-profile potential targets for terrorist attack. Improvements to bridges and tunnels will be required. Authorities must determine if ventilation, escape routes, sprinkler and alarm systems, and surveillance systems are adequate. State and local transportation agencies in both New York and New Jersey will require additional funds to conduct vulnerability assessments and make improvements. The Port Authority has estimated that comprehensive vulnerability assessments of its tunnel and bridge facilities could cost about \$500,000. Comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessments of all of its facilities in the region (tunnels, bridges, airports, marine terminals and transit facilities), along with related technical planning and engineering of possible solutions, might be as high as \$3.5 million.

- (ii) Screen vehicles at bridge and tunnel entrances. In some cases, the highways leading up to bridge and tunnel entrances may need to be widened to permit inspection of trucks and other vehicles without blocking traffic. The Port Authority has estimated that it will cost \$5 million to purchase new vehicle screening equipment and acquire land bordering its facilities to implement a Commercial Vehicle Inspection program. The conduct of these screenings will also require significant manpower. The Port Authority is exploring a program to adapt commercially available x-ray scanning systems and electronic toll tag technology to support random, continuous and thorough inspection of commercial vehicles and cargo containers traveling through its facilities. As envisioned, this program will involve the deployment of specially task-organized teams of Police Officers to include: Commercial Vehicle Inspection, Hazardous Materials Response, Explosive Detection K-9, and Emergency Services personnel using various chemical and radiation detection equipment and under vehicle surveillance hardware. If successful, expansion of the program might extend to coordination with other state and federal police agencies on a regional basis.

- (iii) Improve means of monitoring traffic and communicating with motorists. Officials must have the ability to monitor traffic and communicate with motorists during a contingency to facilitate the movement of vehicles out of crisis areas, ensure that other civilians do not enter a crisis area, and enable the movement of emergency vehicles in and out of the affected area. Funds will be needed for traffic sensors, closed circuit television, electronic signs to send messages to drivers, and a range of security and traffic management improvements. Such enhancements will likely cost about \$20 million.

⁴⁰ "The MTA Network," www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/network.htm. Data as of May 2001.

- (iv) *Develop federal guidelines for highway and bridge/tunnel security measures.* States and localities are implementing security measures that they deem appropriate, though in many cases officials are doing so without a detailed understanding of the threat of terrorism or effective means of countering it. State and local officials need guidance from federal authorities, who have more experience studying and countering the threat of terrorist attack, on measures that can be taken to enhance security on interstate highways, bridges, tunnels, and other transportation infrastructure. Well-publicized federal guidelines would also help reassure the driving public when they encounter security checks, as they would know what sorts of measures to expect on the highway. The U.S. Department of Transportation should issue such guidelines so state authorities can implement effective security measures that people in neighboring states – often just on the other side of a tunnel – can easily understand.

C. Public Transportation: Every year, the New York City subway carries 1.3 billion passengers, and City buses carry an additional 666 million – an average of over seven million passengers on a typical weekday.⁴¹ These networks must be assessed to ensure they can overcome security vulnerabilities and meet transportation requirements during a crisis. The Metropolitan Transportation Agency (MTA) and the Port Authority, which also operates the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) railroad, should take a number of steps along the lines of those taken by its Washington counterpart, including:

- Establishing a back-up rail operations center;
- Placing sensors to detect chemical and biological agents in critical subway and rail stations;
- Enhancing security at bus facilities by installing intrusion detection and monitoring systems on bus facility doors, gates and fences;
- Improving announcement capability inside subway and rail stations to communicate critical information and instructions during emergency;
- Improving the access and tracking of entry to secured areas by utilizing employee identification cards as key cards;
- Training all public transportation employees on security measures, emergency procedures, and conduct during a contingency; and
- Developing a decontamination test program to develop procedures for decontamination of a subway station following chemical or biological exposure.

⁴¹ “The MTA Network,” www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/network.htm. Data as of May 2001.

Daily Public Transportation Ridership in NYC Metropolitan Area	
NYC Subway	3,560,000
NYC Buses	2,000,000
Long Island Rail Road	304,000
PATH	270,000
Metro-North	225,000
Inter-City Buses	200,000
NJ Transit	100,000
Amtrak	24,000
TOTAL	6,683,000

D. Rail System

Railroads are critical to the economy and livelihood of the New York metropolitan area. MTA's Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) and Metro-North Rail Road carry 157 million passengers annually – 304,000 and 255,000 passengers each, respectively, on a typical weekday.⁴² New Jersey Transit and PATH trains bring an additional 100,000 and 270,000 passengers, respectively, from New Jersey to New York City on a typical weekday. Amtrak alone carries 8.59 million passengers in and out of New York each year, including more passengers between New York and Washington each day than all the airlines combined. Amtrak's second-busiest station, Philadelphia, receives less than half this number of passengers.⁴³ Amtrak also carried tens of thousands of passengers, emergency equipment, and mail in the weeks after September 11, when air travel came to a halt and operated at reduced capacity. Its performance during this crisis evidently demonstrated to the American public the reliability and relative safety of rail travel, as reservations on Amtrak's Acela Express in the Northeast Corridor are up 40 percent since September 11th, and its long-distance trains are, on average, 85 percent full.⁴⁴ Amtrak estimates that it will incur \$50 million in added security costs to address the challenges posed by terrorism and other threats to homeland security.⁴⁵

- (i) Enhance security at tracks, train yards, and other facilities. LIRR manages almost 600 miles of track and Metro-North manages 775.⁴⁶ The NYC subway system manages 685 miles of track. Amtrak operates nationwide over 22,000 miles of track, of which it owns a mere 685 miles.⁴⁷ Many miles of these tracks have little or no physical security in place. Similarly, many train yards are

⁴² "The MTA Network," <http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us>.

⁴³ Sen. Tom Carper, "Now Is Not the Time to Abandon Amtrak," *The Hill*, 8 May 2002, p. 25. See also Amtrak, "Amtrak Facts," <http://www.amtrak.com/about/amtrakfacts.html>.

⁴⁴ George D. Warrington, Amtrak President and Chief Executive Officer, letter to Senator Ernest F. Hollings, 16 October 2001.

⁴⁵ Ernest R. Fraizer, Jr., Amtrak Chief of Police and Vice President for Security and Safety, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 13 December 2001.

⁴⁶ "The MTA Network," www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/network.htm. Data as of December 2000.

⁴⁷ Ernest R. Fraizer, Jr., Amtrak Chief of Police and Vice President for Security and Safety, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 13 December 2001.

protected only by fences and barbed wire. Vulnerability assessments must be performed so appropriate enhancements can be made.

The Port Authority estimates that perimeter protection of PATH rail yards, substations, lay-up tracks and maintenance facilities will cost about \$23 million. Amtrak asserts that it needs \$515 million for physical security improvements, employee training, emergency response efforts, and a 270 percent increase in the number of Amtrak police officers and security personnel to permit continuous security coverage on-board trains and increase the presence of security personnel at key railroad infrastructure.⁴⁸

- (ii) Screen passengers and baggage. Just as baggage screening is a critical element of aviation security, steps must be taken to ensure that baggage carried or loaded onto Amtrak or regional trains is examined. While the required steps may not need to be as far-reaching or as drastic as those taken at airports, personnel and equipment should be placed at key rail transportation nodes to screen passengers and their baggage.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) director John Magaw said on March 26 that baggage screening could be required for cruise ships, trains, and long-haul buses, but the TSA Associate Under Secretary for Maritime and Land Security noted that baggage screening for trains might not happen for five years.⁴⁹ Inter-city Amtrak trains roll through the middle of America's largest cities, and New York is at the center of Amtrak's heavily traveled northeast corridor routes. Five years is far too long to wait to implement this critical security measure.

- (iii) Upgrade rail infrastructure. In the \$3.2 billion September 11th Response Package that Amtrak submitted to Congress in late 2001, it requested funds for a number of critical capital improvements that must be supported to enhance security on the rails. Among the requirements are \$898 million to bring tunnels in the New York region up to modern standards for fire- and life-safety protection. It also requested funds to improve Amtrak's ability to handle increased traffic, as it did when other means of transportation were unavailable in the wake of September 11th; it asked Congress for \$101 million to upgrade rail infrastructure in New York and \$947 million to enhance and rebuild the infrastructure of the Northeast Corridor, including improvements needed to make Penn Station more accessible to emergency personnel during an emergency. These requests should be endorsed and approved by Congress.

⁴⁸ Rep. James L. Oberstar, "Amtrak: Getting Passenger Service Back on Track," *The Hill*, 8 May 2002, p. 21.

⁴⁹ Harvey Simon, "TSA Considers Ordering Airport-Type Checks for Baggage Aboard Ships, Trains, Buses," *Aviation Week's Homeland Security and Defense*, 27 March 2002, p. 1.

AMTRAK NORTHEAST CORRIDOR ENHANCEMENTS	
Tunnel fire/safety improvements	\$898 million
Physical security enhancements, employee training, emergency response improvements, additional police officers	\$515 million
Upgraded rail infrastructure	\$101 million
Northeast Corridor infrastructure enhancements	\$947 million
TOTAL	\$2.461 billion

E. Inter-City Bus Network

- (i) Enhance security at bus terminals. The Port Authority Bus Terminal on the West Side of Manhattan is the largest bus terminal in the world, making the facility and the 200,000 people who pass through it each day inviting targets for terrorists. A number of steps are needed to make bus travel safer, including:

- Improvements to physical security at existing terminals;
- Implementing passenger and baggage screening programs;
- Training employees in threat assessment and security operations;
- Hiring additional police and security personnel; and
- Adding and installing surveillance, detection and emergency communications equipment.

According to the American Bus Association, the long-haul bus industry, comprised of 800 private bus and almost 200 tour and travel operators, transports 774 million passengers annually to some 4,000 regularly scheduled destinations.⁵⁰ Bills have been introduced in the Senate (S. 1739) and the House (H.R. 3429) to provide federal grants to bus operators to make security enhancements; the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has approved the bill. Such grants are critical if the cost of such improvements are not to be passed along to bus passengers, who are generally less well-off than train and air travelers and can thus ill afford fare hikes.

These bills should be amended, however, to make terminal operators eligible for assistance as well, as agencies and organizations that operate bus terminals are facing unexpected costs associated with dramatic security improvements. The Port Authority, for example, is not funded to absorb the significant costs associated with enhancements to security at its large and heavily used terminals.

⁵⁰ U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, "Legislation To Improve Nation's Bus Security Approved By Congressional Subcommittee," press release, 16 May 2002.

F. Other

- (i) Place chemical and biological detectors in airports, critical subway stations, and rail and bus stations. Terrorists using chemical or biological agents are likely to target critical transportation nodes, both because they are densely crowded and because travelers will spread disease (and therefore panic) quickly and widely. The 103-mile Washington, DC Metrorail System is installing a prototype chemical agent detection system that should be emulated in New York. All area airports, train stations, bus depots, and critical subway stations should be fitted with chemical and biological detectors. The Port Authority envisions possible deployment of detection systems on its PATH rapid rail transit system (at a cost of \$50 million), at the Bus Terminal (at a cost of \$25 million), in both of its vehicular tunnels, and in airline terminals at each of its three major airports.

Federal agencies should also provide guidelines to local transportation authorities on how to respond in a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological agents. The Federal Transit Administration is developing guidelines for the handling of chemical and biological agents in an urban subway⁵¹; the issuance of guidelines for similar incidents in other transportation networks would also be valuable.

INSTALLATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL SENSORS	
FACILITY / NETWORK	APPROXIMATE COST
NYC Subway	Unknown
PATH	\$50 million
Port Authority Bus Terminal	\$25 million
Tunnels	\$25 million
Metro-North	Unknown
LIRR	Unknown
Airline terminals	\$150 million

⁵¹ Hon. Jennifer L. Dorn, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 13 December 2001.

4. Port and Border Security

<p style="text-align: center;">PORT AND BORDER SECURITY</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS</u></p>	
A. Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct background checks on all port workers and employees of border security agencies • Verify and inspect incoming cargo overseas • Inspect incoming ships away from harbors • Develop “trusted shipper” program to expedite low-risk cargo
B. Interdiction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide additional screening equipment to port authorities, Customs, and Coast Guard to detect explosives and nuclear/biological/chemical agents • Fund additional Customs, INS, and Border Patrol agents • Train port security officers • Upgrade physical security at ports • Fund additional personnel and new and upgraded vessels for Coast Guard

Airport and aviation security have received a great deal of attention and funding, as well they should. A wide range of far-reaching measures have been taken to enhance security at the nation’s airports, including the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration, the issuance of new security measures in airports and on-board aircraft, and other steps. Further funding will be needed to ensure that airport security staffs have adequate personnel and equipment to conduct thorough screenings, and thorough training must be given to these personnel to ensure they have the skills to conduct effective security checks while respecting the civil rights and dignity of passengers. As many such measures have been swiftly implemented already, further details and recommendations on aviation security will not be provided here.

The goods that pass through New York’s ports and border crossings are critical to the nation’s economy. The Port of New York and New Jersey is the third largest in the United States and the largest on the east coast, serving 90 million people in a ten-state area. Over \$86 billion worth of commerce passes through the Port of New York and New Jersey each

year – 12 percent of all U.S. foreign trade (by volume). Over 30 billion gallons of petroleum products, 20 percent of the nation's petroleum imports, passed through the port each year, making the continued functioning of the port during a crisis absolutely critical. In addition, more than 1.9 million trucks and nearly 10.9 million privately owned vehicles entered the United States through New York State's land border crossings alone in 2001, making the inspection of these vehicles also important if the security of New York and the northeastern United States is to be enhanced.

On a more local level, the Port of New York and New Jersey is also critical to the economy of the New York metropolitan area. The goods that pass through the port generate at least \$25 billion for the region's economy, and over 225,000 jobs are created by the port's activities. Disruptions to the port's activities would be devastating to the economy of the New York metropolitan area.

Border security represents the largest single portion of the president's budget proposal (\$10.6 billion), but little funding is allocated for interdiction of contraband, weapons, and other threats. Ninety five percent of all U.S. imports arrive by ship, but the Customs Service has the ability to inspect a mere 2 percent of incoming cargo containers – levels that are unacceptable when the nation's security is at stake.

Current U.S. Customs Service procedures are designed for economic security and, to a lesser extent, drug interdiction, as they focus primarily on the search for contraband and dutiable goods. Italian police arrested an Egyptian man in October 2001 after finding him stowed away in a container on a ship about to cross the Atlantic. His container was furnished with a bed and a bucket and was stocked with food and water, and the suspect had a satellite phone, maps, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt. Had the suspect not drawn attention to himself because he had trouble breathing, it is unlikely that he would have been found. New procedures must be put in place that would make it more likely to uncover such infiltrators, as well as the nuclear, chemical, or biological agents that they might smuggle in to the country. The Customs Service must receive funding for a wide range of employee training and equipment to enable it to refocus on physical security.

The U.S. Coast Guard has been heavily burdened since September 11th by the conduct of the largest port security operation since World War II. Vessels and personnel were redeployed from their core missions, 25 percent of its Reserve personnel were placed on active duty,⁵² and thousands of vessels have been boarded, escorted, or interdicted on their way into U.S. harbors. The Coast Guard more than tripled the number of active duty personnel in New York in the weeks following September 11th to 1,600; even now, its normal personnel strength of 500 has been augmented by 100 Reservists – a 20 percent increase. It also conducts daily flights over New York harbor, a step that was only taken twice a week before September 11th,⁵³ and it has a vessel patrolling the harbor, including

⁵² Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto, Director of Operations Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 26 February 2002.

⁵³ Associated Press, "Congressmen Want N.Y. Harbor Security Boost," *New York Newsday*, 23 April 2002.

Jamaica Bay, 24 hours a day.⁵⁴ The Coast Guard requires massive amounts of additional funding to maintain its pace of operations and implement a range of security enhancements at port facilities. Reflecting these requirements, its 2003 budget request adds \$700 million for operating expenses and \$90 million for acquisition, construction, and improvements to its 2002 budget.

FACTS ABOUT NEW YORK PORT AND BORDER SECURITY	
Value of goods that pass through the Port of New York and New Jersey	\$86 billion per year
Percent of U.S. foreign trade handled by the Port of New York and New Jersey	12 percent
Amount of petroleum products that pass through the Port of New York and New Jersey	30 billion gallons per year
Percent of all U.S. petroleum imports that pass through the Port of New York and New Jersey	20 percent
Regional economic activity generated by Port of New York and New Jersey	\$25 billion per year
Number of jobs created by Port activities	225,000
Increase in Coast Guard personnel stationed in New York since September 11	20 percent
Length of New York State–Canada border	594 miles
Number of Border Patrol agents currently assigned to the New York State–Canada border	87

The INS's Border Patrol seeks to add an additional 570 agents in FY2003, 285 of whom would be placed on the country's northern border – a much needed step, as a mere 87 border patrol agents are currently assigned to protect the 594 miles of border that lie in New York alone.⁵⁵ The INS also plans to maintain an air surveillance program capable of

⁵⁴ Bryan Virasami, "N.Y. Harbor Security Gets Boost," *New York Newsday*, 24 April 2002.

⁵⁵ Senator Charles Schumer, "Homeland Security Proposals Could Ease Local Budget Pressure," press release, 1 February 2002.

responding 24 hours a day, and it has signed an agreement with the Department of Defense allowing National Guard troops and equipment to assist in border enforcement duties.⁵⁶

Port and border security requirements affect the entire country, not just New York City. They fall into two primary areas.

- A. Prevention – measures to inspect cargos before they enter the United States and prevent domestic threats from manifesting themselves
 - (i) Conduct background checks on all people working at critical ports of entry (airports, seaports, and borders). Criminal background investigations should be conducted on port and border employees to ensure that any individuals responsible for processing goods or people entering the United States are sufficiently trustworthy to perform their jobs effectively.
 - (ii) Get shippers and foreign port authorities to verify cargo in overseas ports. Just as the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts some passenger screening at foreign airports, the Customs Service has argued that it should work with foreign countries to screen incoming cargos before they leave port.⁵⁷ U.S. Customs inspectors already work at ports in Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, an arrangement that could serve as a model for cooperation with other countries. Given that 68 percent of shipping containers entering the United States pass through 20 overseas “megaports,” partnerships with a small number of countries could enhance the security of a large portion of incoming shipments.⁵⁸ The Administration should provide the political support for Customs to negotiate such agreements, and its should request funds for this purpose in its homeland security budget. The Coast Guard, as well as shipping companies, foreign ports, and cargo handlers, should be asked to share in the costs of verifying cargo overseas.
 - (iii) Provide the Coast Guard with sufficient resources to inspect incoming ships away from U.S. harbors. In many cases, the Coast Guard will be able to board ships before they enter U.S. harbors in order to inspect cargos, examine manifests, and verify the identities of crew members. Since September 11th, the Coast Guard has conducted an average of 100 boardings per month, up from 100 per year. The Coast Guard already plans enhancements to the New York area that will cost about \$3 million: the provision of an additional small boat for Station Sandy Hook, 40 additional personnel for the greater New York area, four secure internet connections for New York area units, and additional night

⁵⁶ Henry L. Stinton, General Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 12 March 2002, p. 8. GAO document GAO-02-490T.

⁵⁷ Bonni G. Tischler, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 26 February 2002.

⁵⁸ Greg Lamm, “Customs Seeks Container Pacts with 20 Foreign Seaports,” *Aviation Week’s Homeland Security and Defense*, 5 June 2002, p. 4.

vision goggles, VHF radios, and satellite telephones. Funds must continue to be provided in the Coast Guard budget to ensure the Service has sufficient resources to undertake its critical homeland security missions in the New York area.

- (iv) Develop a “trusted shipper” system to expedite cargos from trusted sources. As the primary challenge is to strike an ideal balance between security and the timely movement of goods, companies and vessels that develop a solid track record over time can be added to a “trusted shipper” roster that expedites their cargos. These shippers should still be subject to random inspections to ensure that terrorists or smugglers do not try to take advantage of their preferential status, but the demonstrated lower risk posed by “trusted shippers” will permit the Customs Service and Coast Guard to focus their finite resources on potentially greater threats. By the same token, ships from ports that fail to employ acceptable security standards should be denied entry to the United States. The establishment of a trusted shipper program has been endorsed by the Gilmore Commission (the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction).⁵⁹

The Administration has already accepted the concept of such “trusted shipper” programs. On April 16, federal officials announced that America’s Big Three automakers, plus Motorola, Sara Lee, Target, and BP America signed up to the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a joint initiative between government and business designed to protect the security of cargo entering the United States while improving the flow of trade. In exchange for working with suppliers and shippers to guarantee enhanced security from the point of origin to the point of delivery, Customs will expedite these companies’ shipments at U.S. border crossings. Any company that imports into the United States may apply to become a C-TPAT participant.

B. Interdiction – measures to intercept threats once they have entered U.S. territory.

- (i) Provide funding for additional cargo screening equipment to port authorities, the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard for the detection of conventional explosives, as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. The Port of Newark and Elizabeth has a single x-ray machine to inspect shipping containers, and two additional portable machines have been provided since September 11th. Funds must be provided for additional machines, which cost as much as \$10 million each. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 3013) authorizes \$68 million through 2006 for screening and detection equipment and should be supported.

⁵⁹ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 15 December 2001, p. 38.

- (ii) Appropriate funds for additional Customs, INS, and Border Patrol agents. Even though the Customs Service has increased its personnel at the Port of Newark and Elizabeth by 30 percent since September 11th, a mere 100 inspectors must examine more than 5,000 containers that arrive every day.⁶⁰ The president should accept and fund the U.S. Conference of Mayors' call for funding to triple the number of Customs Agents, INS agents, and Border Patrol officers.⁶¹ The president's proposal includes \$76.3 million to hire, train, and deploy an additional 570 Border Patrol agents nationwide. Some of these officers must augment the mere 87 border patrol agents who are currently assigned to protect the 594 miles of border that lie in New York. The Seaport, Maritime and Rail Security Act of 2001 (S. 1214) proposes giving \$145 million to the Customs Service for the hiring of 1,200 new inspectors and 300 new agents, a figure that would go a long way toward improving security at port facilities.

- (iii) Train port security officers. The American Association of Port Authorities has proposed the development of a standardized training curriculum for port security officers to ensure that all such officials receive a minimum level of skills.⁶² The Seaport, Maritime and Rail Security Act of 2001 (S. 1214) directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a program to develop standards and procedures for training and certification of maritime security professionals, including the establishment of the Maritime Security Institute at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy's Global Maritime and Transportation School to train and certify such professionals in accordance with internationally recognized law enforcement standards. The bill authorizes appropriations of \$22 million through 2006 for this purpose and should be supported.

- (iv) Upgrade physical security at ports. Physical security at the New York area ports must be improved through enhanced fencing, motion sensors, closed circuit television cameras, limits on vehicle movement within ports, and other capital improvements. Access to secure areas should be limited to authorized employees whose identities are verified by advanced ID cards or biometrics, just as airports manage access to runways and other secure areas.

The Port Authority's rough estimate of security enhancements that might be required at all of its New York and New Jersey maritime cargo facilities, to include such things as perimeter and waterside protection, a security control center, closed circuit TV expansion, emergency evacuation improvements, and critical utility monitoring, could cost around about \$70 million.

⁶⁰ David Carr, "The Futility of Homeland Defense," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002, p. 55.

⁶¹ U.S. Conference of Mayors, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America's Cities*, December 2001, p. 16.

⁶² American Association of Port Authorities, "AAPA Policy Position on Seaport Security," www.aapa-ports.org.

Without state-directed funding or federal reimbursements for completed security enhancements, many U.S. ports will be unable to meet new security challenges.⁶³ Transportation Secretary Mineta announced in mid-June that \$92.3 million in grants would be awarded to 51 ports nationwide to enhance facility and operational security. The Port of New York and New Jersey will receive \$8.9 million under this program. Though these grants are certainly welcome, they are insufficient to meet the need; the Transportation Department received over 850 applications requesting a total of \$700 million in assistance. Congress has already appropriated \$93.3 million to the Transportation Security Administration for port security assessments and improvements,⁶⁴ and New York area ports should apply aggressively for grants under this program. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 3013) would provide \$80 million in loan guarantees and grants by 2006 for security infrastructure improvements at U.S. seaports and should be supported.

- (v) Provide funds to the Coast Guard for additional personnel, new vessels, and upgrades to existing vessels and equipment. The Coast Guard is drastically under funded to take on new homeland security missions and maintain its new pace of operations. In its 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard has requested funds for:

Port vulnerability assessments for the nation's most critical ports	\$10.3 million
Establishment of intelligence fusion centers for the collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence information, including hiring of 800 personnel	\$88 million
160 Sea Marshals to conduct armed escort of high interest vessels	\$18 million
6 Maritime Safety and Security Teams with nearly 500 active-duty personnel and 44 new port security response boats	\$47.5 million
Anti-terrorism and force protection enhancements to Coast Guard facilities, including chemical, biological, and radiological countermeasures	\$51 million
TOTAL	\$214.8 million

⁶³ Kim E. Petersen, Executive Director, Maritime Security Council, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 26 February 2002.

⁶⁴ Department of Transportation, "U.S. Department of Transportation Establishes Port Security Grants for Critical National Seaports," press release DOT 17-02, 28 February 2002.

5. Critical Infrastructure Protection

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

- Provide grants to conduct vulnerability assessments
- Offer tax incentives to private entities to conduct vulnerability assessments and make security enhancements
- Set minimum standards for energy infrastructure protection
- Enhance security at nuclear power facilities
- Improve security of water supply, including reservoirs, treatment plants, and pipelines
- Conduct security assessments of energy pipelines and place sensors on pipelines
- Increase funding for cyberspace security
- Develop and implement new mail screening protocols
- Fund police training with private sector

One of the most basic ways to ensure the protection of New York's communities is to enhance the security of critical infrastructure to ensure that facilities are safe from attack and that critical services can continue to be provided in a crisis.

For this reason, James Kallstrom, who recently stepped down as director of the New York State Office of Public Security, has asserted that "there is nothing that is more of a national security asset than the power grid."⁶⁵ Nuclear and conventional power plants and their related infrastructure (transmission wires, towers, sub-stations, etc.) must receive added attention, though protecting the more than 1,000 power-related potential terrorist targets in New York City is a significant challenge that will take large amounts of planning, manpower, and funding.

Almost as important as continued provision of power is the continued functioning of cyberspace, on which both emergency services and the private sector increasingly rely. Measures must be taken to enhance the security of critical computer networks so critical services do not fail in the wake of a terrorist attack.

⁶⁵ Jayson Blair, "Post-9/11, Questioning Security at Electric Plants," *New York Times*, 17 May 2002, p. A23.

The safety of the drinking water supply is also critical. Just as medieval armies besieging a city cut off food and water supplies, interruptions to New York's drinking water would be a devastating blow to public health and morale. New York City's nineteen reservoirs supply 1.3 billion gallons of water daily to over 8 million City residents; another million residents of Westchester, Putnam, Ulster, and Orange Counties; and the millions of tourists and businesspeople who visit the City. This water is supplied through an enormous network of aqueducts, tunnels, and pipes, all of which must be secured. The 2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 107-117) provided EPA with \$175.6 million for counter-terrorism initiatives, including assessments of public water systems' vulnerability to terrorist attack. The president's FY2003 budget requests \$246 million for security at water infrastructure facilities, even though the American Water Works Association has asserted that \$450 million is required for vulnerability assessments alone, with another \$1.6 billion to upgrade security at water facilities and prevent cyber attacks on the facilities' computer systems. The Brookings Institution recently reported that enhanced security, to include physical security enhancements at reservoirs and pumps and continued testing of water for chemical and biological agents, would cost about \$400 million per year nationwide.⁶⁶

All City and State agencies that manage critical infrastructure must conduct thorough vulnerability assessments to determine their weaknesses and identify potential solutions. All agencies should incorporate their findings into continuity of operations plans that outline their abilities to continue to provide services during and after a crisis.

State governments are bearing an enormous burden in providing security for key facilities. It is estimated that state governments will spend as much as \$1 billion to protect critical infrastructure in 2002 alone, including:

- \$100 million on enhanced security at airports beyond that requested by the president;
- \$58 million on added security for nuclear power plants in response to guidance received from the Homeland Security Director;
- \$46 million in 2002 for security at dams and bridges that are vital to transportation;
- \$28 million for security precautions for gas pipelines and electric power plants; and
- \$11 million for security at water and sewer facilities.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Greg Lamm, "Tight Security at Treatment Plants, Holding Tanks Is Best Defense for Water Supply, Officials Say," *Aviation Week's Homeland Security & Defense*, vol. 1, no. 17, 22 May 2002, p.1.

⁶⁷ National Governors Association, *Homeland Security: The Cost to States for Ensuring Public Health and Safety*, 5 December 2001.

The Port Authority, also envisions large expenditures for physical security at critical facilities. Its initial assessments call for as much as \$1 billion in security enhancements over a multi-year period. Estimated requirements to Port Authority facilities in the New York City area include:

SECURITY ENHANCEMENT	ESTIMATED COST
Perimeter Security	\$127 million
Access Control	\$52 million
Surveillance Systems	\$50 million
Security Control Centers and Communications	\$131 million
Hazardous Materials Detection (Chemical, Biological, Radiological)	\$60 million
Structural Security Improvements	\$585 million
Security Studies	\$6 million
TOTAL	\$1.0 BILLION

Because state and local governments are already bearing a large portion of infrastructure protection costs, involvement by the private sector in critical infrastructure protection is crucial, as many key services – from electrical power to steam heat to medical and financial services – are provided by private entities. A national strategy must be developed that includes arrangements for public-private partnerships along the lines of the preparations to handle the “Y2K” computer crashes that were expected at the turn of the millennium.⁶⁸ Tax incentives and other subsidies should also be provided to critical service providers as necessary to ensure that they are able to continue their operations during a crisis without passing increased costs on to consumers.

Required critical infrastructure protection initiatives include:

- (i) *Grants for the conduct of vulnerability assessments:* Grants should be provided to key City and State agencies to conduct vulnerability assessments and incorporate their findings into their continuity of operations plans. Recipients should include:
 - The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey;
 - The Metropolitan Transportation Agency (MTA), whose resources would be used by civilians evacuating the area;

⁶⁸ Henry L. Stinton, General Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, 12 March 2002, p. 12. GAO document GAO-02-490T. *See also* General Accounting Office, *Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Lessons Can Be Applied to Other Management Challenges*, GAO/AIMD-00-290, 12 September 2000.

- NYC Department of Environmental Protection, which manages the City’s water supply and wastewater treatment;
 - NY State Department of Environmental Conservation, which has identified a need to identify and catalog underground fuel storage facilities that pose potential risks to life and property if affected by a terrorist attack; and
 - The US Postal Service, to evaluate the safety of large facilities in the City.
- (ii) *Tax incentives for the conduct of vulnerability assessments and enhancement of security by private entities:* Banks, hospitals, and other private entities need to conduct similar vulnerability assessments. Tax incentives should be provided for this purpose, as well as for steps taken to enhance the security of facilities from terrorist attack. Recipients should include:
- Power generators such as Con Edison, KeySpan Energy, and other entities that generate electrical power and steam heat.
 - Nuclear power plants like the Entergy Corporation, which operates the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in Westchester County, less than 50 miles from New York City. Security vulnerabilities at Indian Point were highlighted by a television reporter’s assertion on April 18 that he spent 20 minutes flying over the plant in a small aircraft and that no attempt was made to intercept him.
 - The New York Stock Exchange, whose continued operation is critical for the national and international economy and to ensure continued confidence in U.S. financial markets.
- (iii) *Setting of minimum security standards for energy infrastructure.* New York City has more than 1,000 power-related facilities that could be targets for terrorist attack, including electric power plants, sub-stations, transmission lines, pipelines, and 40 Major Oil Storage Facilities (refineries, transfer terminals, etc.) that hold more than 400,000 gallons of petroleum.⁶⁹ Power facilities are especially vulnerable, both because energy facilities often have large amounts of combustible material on-site and because a significant interruption to the power supply would paralyze the City. Unless power companies demonstrate that they are taking considerable steps to enhance security and ensure sufficient redundancy that an attack on one facility would not cripple the area, federal and State officials may want to step in by creating minimum security standards for such facilities. New York State Assembly Member Michael Gianaris, who represents Astoria, Queens, has introduced legislation in the State House to create such minimum standards and ensure

⁶⁹ Jayson Blair, “Post-9/11, Questioning Security at Electric Plants,” *New York Times*, 17 May 2002, p. A23. Also see testimony of Mary Ellen Kris, Regional Director, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, before the New York City Council Committee on Environmental Protection, 7 June 2002.

that security measures are put in place.⁷⁰ Other states and localities may want to emulate Assemblyman Gianaris' legislation as a way to ensure that critical infrastructure is adequately protected.

- (iv) Measures to secure nuclear power facilities. New York State has six nuclear power facilities – FitzPatrick, Ginna, Indian Point 2 and 3, and Nine Mile Point 1 and 2. The Indian Point plants in Westchester County are less than 50 miles from New York City – close enough to cause health problems and massive logistical complications for City residents and workers if a crisis were to develop. A 1982 study by Sandia National Labs estimated that an accident at either Indian Point reactor would cause over 200,000 deaths and as much as \$300 billion (in 1982 dollars) in property damage within a year.⁷¹ It is imperative that nuclear power facilities conduct security assessments that identify their vulnerabilities and incorporate their findings into emergency action and evacuation plans. Funds should be made available to encourage the swift implementation of revised emergency plans, but the power companies themselves should also be called upon to bear a substantial portion of the costs.

In December, then-Director of the New York State Office of Public Security James Kallstrom announced that several federal and State agencies, including the FBI, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the New York State Office of Emergency Management, had assessed long-term security needs at Indian Point. Among the recommendations, which Entergy has already begun to implement, were more frequent testing of the security forces at Indian Point, perhaps augmented with the assistance of the FBI, and better integration and coordination among law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction of Indian Point.⁷² Entergy and the New York State and federal agencies involved in the assessment should be lauded for quickly conducting, completing, and implementing the assessment, which is a model for cooperation between the private sector and government agencies at all levels.

- (v) Improvements to security of the water supply. The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which manages the City's drinking water supply, had already taken a wide range of security measures before September 11th and is thus well prepared for new homeland security challenges. It had already contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a security assessment of the water supply system and had a work plan in place when the terrorist attacks occurred. Using funds already made available to the

⁷⁰ Statement on Homeland Security from Assembly Member Michael N. Gianaris, 10 May 2002. Also see New York State Assembly bill number A.9549a, "An act to amend the executive law, in relation to the creation of security measures for power generating and transmitting facilities."

⁷¹ Office of New York State Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, *Interim Report on the Evacuation Plan for the Indian Point Nuclear Facility*, 20 February 2002, p. 47.

⁷² New York State Governor's Office, "Kallstrom: Indian Point Security Review Complete," press release, 12 December 2002. http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/year01/dec12_4_01.htm.

City, DEP is implementing a \$30 million program of security improvements, including physical security enhancements and the addition of 70 watershed police officers to the current 200-strong force.

Federal funding is needed, however, to deploy a \$14 million water quality alert system comprised of sensor-laden buoys that would be placed in reservoirs and other surface water sources. The Robotic Monitoring System, developed by the Upstate Freshwater Institute in Syracuse, New York, will provide critical early warning of potential safety hazards in the drinking water supply, whether caused by terrorist attack or not. EPA should place the necessary funds for this project in its budget.

- (vi) Security assessments and placement of sensors on pipelines. Thousands of miles of gas, steam, and fuel pipelines run to the City and underneath populated areas of the City. The effects of a pipeline explosion become widely understood on the rare but tragic occasions when a steam pipe explodes in a residential neighborhood, damaging buildings and causing residents to evacuate the area, sometimes for days or weeks, while the damage is repaired. Pipeline operators must conduct security assessments to determine if any of their pipes or facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Sensors need to be installed on critical pipelines and in pipelines running through residential areas to detect leaks and damage early, before a minor incident poses dangers to safety and causes widespread damage to property and the continued provision of service. *The Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act* (H.R. 3609), passed by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and *The Energy Pipeline Research, Development, and Demonstration Act* (H.R. 3929) both address pipeline safety issues.
- (vii) Funding for Cyberspace security. The Administration has placed an emphasis on information technology security for federal agencies, as demonstrated by its request for \$4.5 billion in FY2003, an increase of 64% over the previous year. Most of that money, however, will be spent on federal departments and agencies. The Administration has requested no funds, however, to provide matching grants for state and local governments, which also must make extensive improvements to the security of their information technology infrastructure. Congress should approve, and the president should sign, the USA Act (H.R. 3555), would provide \$2 billion for such matching grants.
- (viii) New screening methods for mail. The Postal Service should be provided funds to develop mail processing and screening standards that strike a balance between security and efficiency. Initial efforts to screen and irradiate mail addressed to Congress, it should be noted, have dramatically improved security, but measures have caused such delays and damage to incoming mail that it has become less practical to rely on regular mail service. Procedures must continue to be streamlined and guidance disseminated to all Postal Service customers. The Postal Service estimates that it will spend \$445

million nationwide in FY 2003 for screening and decontamination equipment used to screen and treat the mail.

- (ix) *Police training with private sector.* Many private facilities employ private security companies to provide basic physical security. Given that these forces will serve as the initial interface with first responders responding to a crisis at their facilities, selected security agents should receive training from local law enforcement on preventative security measures and standard procedures to observe in a crisis. Since such training will add considerably to the cost of law enforcement training programs, federal support would be welcomed.

6. Health Care

HEALTH CARE

SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

- Create vaccine clearinghouse
- Stockpile potassium iodide (KI) at City schools and hospitals
- Train emergency room staff and epidemiologists in detection of and response to biological attacks
- Provide communications gear to hospitals to communicate better with each other and with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
- Encourage participation in the Medical Reserve Corps
- Improve City's ability to mobilize medical professionals

The nation's healthcare network could be hit doubly hard in case of a terrorist attack or other contingency. Hospitals and other healthcare facilities, particularly in large cities like New York, will receive waves of casualties in case of a physical attack like those that took place on September 11th. However, emergency room staff and even private internists may be the first to see evidence of a biological or chemical attack. Doctors and healthcare professionals need to receive training in how to recognize such incidents, their facilities must be given the resources needed to address a crisis, and infrastructure must be put in place to allow medical centers to exchange information on suspected incidents with each other and with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).

Hospitals will have to assess their ability to manage bioterrorism and high-casualty crises, taking steps, for example, to ensure that they can contain the spread of illness if a highly contagious patient walked into the emergency room and communicate with EMTs, first responders, public health officials, and other hospitals during a high-volume crisis. Two-thirds of the nation's hospitals have incorporated bioterrorism into their disaster contingency plans, and the remaining one-third need to do so immediately. State and local officials will need to determine if they require mutual aid agreements with neighboring states or communities and if they can quickly issue emergency credentials to protect out-of-state doctors and local institutions from liability. In some cases, state and local laws may need to be revised, and funds may need to be provided for capital improvements like the installation of compartmented ventilation systems or new interoperable communications equipment.⁷³

⁷³ White House Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, Remarks to the American Hospital Association, 8 April 2002.

States are already bearing much of the cost. Bioterrorism preparedness could cost state governments \$3 billion in 2002 alone.⁷⁴ Federal support should help defray state and local governments' costs for measures already being undertaken, as well as for additional steps to secure our nation's health. Among the additional measures that must receive support are:

- (i) *Creation of a vaccine clearinghouse.* Recent studies by the Centers for Disease Control show that there is a shortage of 8 out of the 23 vaccines given in the United States. To address this problem, I introduced H.R. 4100, the Healthy Families Promotion Act. This bill creates the position of Assistant Secretary for Vaccines to report directly to the Secretary for Health and Human Services. In the case of an emergency or bio-terrorist attack, this person will be responsible for developing, periodically reviewing, and, as appropriate, revising an emergency response and contingency plan regarding vaccines.

This bill would create a central clearinghouse at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to oversee federal and private vaccine purchase and distribution contracts so that the supply and distribution of these vaccines are known. My bill ensures that one person, reporting to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, knows who ordered which vaccine, how much they ordered, whether or not the production schedule is on track, who is responsible for the delivery, and whether or not the delivery was made on time. HHS needs such a mechanism to anticipate and prevent vaccine shortages – an important first step in combating bioterrorism.

- (ii) *Stockpiling potassium iodide (KI) at City schools and hospitals.* The Indian Point nuclear power plants in Westchester County are located less than 50 miles from New York City. A disaster at these facilities has the potential to threaten the near- and long-term health of New York City's eight million residents. Doses of non-radioactive iodine, typically in the form of potassium iodide (KI), can prevent the concentration of radioactive iodine in the thyroid following a nuclear accident and thus help prevent thyroid cancer. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission voted in December 2000 to help pay for state stockpiles of KI tablets – enough for one or two doses for every person located within a 10-mile emergency zone – and Westchester County announced on May 31 that it would begin distributing KI free to residents of the 10-mile zone on June 8. The Westchester County Health Department has also worked with pharmacies to make sure that a supply of KI is commercially available.⁷⁵ More than a dozen states are beginning to stockpile

⁷⁴ National Governors Association, *Homeland Security: The Cost to States for Ensuring Public Health and Safety*, 5 December 2001.

⁷⁵ Westchester County, "Westchester County Begins Distribution of Potassium Iodide," press release, <http://www.westchestergov.com/currentnews/potassiumiodidedoc.htm>.

KI pills.⁷⁶ Since KI must be taken within several hours of exposure, a system must be in place to get KI tablets into the hands of citizens swiftly.

Funds must therefore be provided for FEMA and state agencies to:

- ensure that KI tablets have been stockpiled at public facilities – schools, hospitals, government offices, etc. – within 50 miles of nuclear facilities; and
- develop plans to distribute stockpiled KI tablets promptly to all individuals within 50 miles of nuclear facilities after a radioactive release.

- (iii) Provision of funds to train emergency room staff and epidemiologists in detection of and response to biological attacks. Many emergency room staff and private physicians are unfamiliar with the diseases that might be spread by biological weapons. In fact, several of the victims of anthrax attacks in late 2001 were originally misdiagnosed by their physicians. Funds must be made available to provide epidemiological training for emergency medical personnel so they can quickly recognize the signs of a suspected biological attack. The \$20 million allocated by the president to modernize and strengthen the CDC's Epidemiological Intelligence Service is an excellent first step toward putting actionable medical information in the hands of medical providers, and further enhancements to this service may be required in future years.

As part of a training effort called for under New York State's bioterrorism preparedness plan, the State is distributing bioterror response information cards to each of the more than 70,000 physicians statewide. The card highlights twelve diseases, including smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fever, that are caused by organisms considered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to be the most likely bioterrorist weapons. Since these diseases are rare and may be unfamiliar to many doctors, the card was designed to provide easily accessible information on the diseases symptoms, tests used for diagnosis, and treatment. The card also instructs physicians to be alert for clues that may suggest a bioterrorism event, such as a sudden increase in the number of people seeking care, especially patients with fever, respiratory or gastrointestinal symptoms. Physicians are instructed to immediately report any unusual illnesses to their local health department.

- (iv) Communications equipment for hospitals to communicate with each other, first responders, and the CDC. Medical facilities must improve their abilities to disseminate and receive information across jurisdictions on disease outbreaks, utilization of drugs, and other data that would help diagnose or respond to a biological attack. Only two-thirds of hospitals nationwide, for example, are connected to the Centers for Disease Control. Funds must be

⁷⁶ Editorial, "Pills for Nuclear Plant Radiation," *New York Times*, 13 June 2002, p. A34.

provided to connect the remaining third to the CDC's network.

- (v) Establishment of a Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), as outlined in the section on First Responders, above, to take advantage of the years of medical expertise and experience in the community-at-large. The White House has made an MRC a central component of its Citizen Corps program, and it should expeditiously implement the program so the nation can take advantage of the skills of all of its trained citizens. New Yorkers should participate actively.
- (vi) Improve ability to call up medical professionals in an emergency. The establishment of a Medical Reserve Corps will create the mechanism for deploying trained medical professionals in the event of a contingency. Federal funds provided to New York State for bioterrorism preparedness will also provide \$875,000 to the Medical Society of the State of New York (MSSNY) to establish and maintain an up-to-date database of doctors throughout New York State (including New York City) that provides contact information, lists specialty and board certification by regional area, and formalizes a network of trained volunteer doctors who could participate in a community-wide response to a public health emergency. The New York State Nurses Association will also receive \$100,000 to formalize a network of trained volunteer nurses who could augment emergency medical staff. Additional funds should be provided, as needed, to ensure that these databases are maintained and updated.

7. Recovery

RECOVERY

SUMMARY OF NYC REQUIREMENTS

- Make confiscated terrorist assets available to victims' families
- Provide federal backing for terrorism insurance
- Facilitate forensic engineering

The federal government has already provided some assistance to help the New York City economy recover from the effects of the September 11th disaster. The \$20 billion provided to New York in March by President Bush is a comprehensive package that will address all aspects of the City's reconstruction, including:

- A \$5 billion economic stimulus plan to retain jobs and investment in Lower Manhattan, including tax credits for businesses south of Canal Street, billions of dollars in bonding authority to encourage private development, and a variety of enticements to retain and attract businesses to Lower Manhattan;
- \$2.75 billion in new FEMA funds to reimburse the City and State for expenses like overtime, lost equipment, destroyed or damaged facilities, and environmental remediation;
- Federal help for restoring the destroyed energy and telecommunications infrastructure in lower Manhattan;
- Liability insurance to ensure the completion of the clean up effort by protecting the City and contractors from potentially crippling law suits;
- \$1.8 billion to the Port Authority and MTA toward a \$3 billion state of the art transit station that includes the rebuilding of the PATH station with an underground connection to all MTA lines in lower Manhattan;
- \$167 million to rebuild the West Side Highway and streets in lower Manhattan;
- \$750 million to rebuild lower Manhattan's destroyed telecommunications and energy infrastructure to prevent utilities like Con Ed and Verizon from having to pass rebuilding expenses onto New York's rate payers; and
- A \$5 billion Liberty Zone economic stimulus package to encourage residents and businesses to stay in or relocate to lower Manhattan, including tax credits to small businesses located in or moving to lower Manhattan, tax-exempt bonds to replace

the 20 million square feet of office space destroyed on September 11th, advanced refunding of municipal bonds, and other measures.

Additional measures must also be taken to ensure full recovery of the New York area, facilitate recovery from future incidents, and provide a sense of justice to the families of victims.

- (i) *Make terrorists' assets available to victims' families.* Section 806 of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) subjects all assets of terrorist organizations to civil forfeiture. The Treasury Department's Operation Green Quest has seized more \$10 million in smuggled U.S. currency and more than \$4 million in other assets.⁷⁷ Rather than be held indefinitely or go into the general treasury, confiscated assets should be made available to victims of terrorist attacks.

In recent testimony to the House Financial Services Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Violent Crime Juan C. Zerate stated that terrorist assets frozen under the USA Patriot Act are not subject to payment to victims' families because, as with legislation freezing assets of hostile regimes like Iran or the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the U.S. government usually intends to return frozen assets to a legitimate successor regime.⁷⁸ However, there can be no legitimate owner of assets used by terrorist organizations to murder American citizens. There is no one to whom these assets can be rightfully returned. These assets should be made available as compensation to the victims of terrorism and their families, as called for by H.R. 3703, the Restoring Justice to Victims of Terrorism Act.

- (ii) *Provide terrorism insurance.* Last fall the House of Representatives passed the Terrorism Risk Protection Act (H.R. 3210), which would help ensure that another terrorist attack would not devastate our economy. Under this legislation, private insurance would pay for damages up to \$10 billion, and the federal government would guarantee against catastrophic losses up to \$100 billion. The Senate is considering a similar bill, S. 2600. The property damage caused on September 11th – estimates range from \$36 billion to \$54 billion – have led many insurers to exclude acts of terrorism from property and casualty coverage. Without coverage against terrorist attacks, regional economies could be devastated by future acts of violence. Higher insurance premiums caused by the potential for enormous payouts in case of disaster eat into profits and prevent some ventures from even getting off the ground, thereby slowing economic growth and hindering job creation. The Senate is reviewing the legislation passed by the House; it should pass the bill as well, and the president should sign it into law.

⁷⁷ Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, Remarks to U.S. Customs Air and Marine Branch, Jacksonville, Florida, 26 February 2002. As cited in Treasury Department press release PO-1047.

⁷⁸ Juan C. Zerate, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing on Patriot Act Oversight: Investigating Patterns of Terrorist Financing, 12 February 2002.

- (iii) *Facilitate forensic engineering.* No bit of engineering or structural change can bring back any of the 3,000 people who perished on September 11th. But learning from the lessons of that horrific event can help ensure we mitigate future deaths from catastrophic attack.

Following Osama bin Laden's bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the government established the Inman Commission to recommend new ways to build our embassies to respond to threats present in a new environment. I propose a similar commission be established on anti-terrorism building construction to ensure that newly constructed buildings in high visibility areas meet certain security standards that will enable them to better survive a terrorist attack or other natural disaster. Just as many western states require buildings to meet earthquake survivability standards, similar standards should be created to address the potential of terrorist attack.

Several New York City agencies and private building experts – including the Society of Professional Engineers, the Architects Council of New York City, the Real Estate Board of New York, and the Building Trade Employers Association – are participating in a Task Force to Review the Safety of Buildings in Relation to the Terrorist Attack on the World Trade Center. The Task Force is charged with reviewing whether changes to building design, construction, or safety standards are required.

A federal Taskforce and Guidelines on Anti-Terrorism Construction should also be established to help ensure that the buildings in which people live and work are as structurally sound as possible and offer the highest possible chances of survival in case of a severe attack. Federal funding should also be provided to conduct research on fireproofing technologies and requirements for foundations and connection strength so that new information can be used to help formulate improved policies and procedures.

In addition, I strongly support appropriating additional funds to the National Institute of Standards and Technology – the agency responsible for investigating building collapses after disasters – to ensure a full and thorough study of the wreckage of the World Trade Center and of buildings that may be future targets as well.

8. Foreign Policy Initiatives

FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

- Fund programs to secure nuclear, biological and chemical materials in Russia and former Soviet republics

- A. Augment funding for programs to enhance security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials overseas. Since 1991, institutes in the former Soviet Union have lost at least 88 pounds of weapons-usable nuclear materials, which are stored in over 300 buildings in over 40 facilities throughout Russia.⁷⁹ The Departments of Defense and Energy, through their Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Programs, work with the Russian Federation to enhance security at facilities containing nuclear materials. U.S.-funded enhancements include perimeter security upgrades, computerization of inventory management systems, development of state-of-the-art storage facilities for materials taken from dismantled nuclear weapons, transportation upgrades to protect shipments of nuclear materials from small-arms fire, conversion of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) into low-enriched uranium suitable for nuclear power facilities, and training for emergency response teams.

These programs must be funded fully until their work is completed; cutting their resources is a short-term cost-saving measure that, over the long-term, is penny-wise and pound-foolish. Funding for CTR programs decreased from \$461 million in FY2000 to \$443 million in FY2001, a figure which the Administration reduced to \$403 million in FY2002. The FY2003 Administration request for Department of Defense CTR activities, \$416.7 million, is a welcome 3.4 percent increase over the previous year but still inadequate to do the job. Funding should be restored to at least the \$461 million appropriated in FY2000. The Administration has also proposed an increase in funding for a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia from \$50 million in FY2002 to \$133.6 million in FY2003, as well as increases to funding for biological weapons nonproliferation initiatives – initiatives which, due to the Soviet Union’s extensive biological and chemical warfare programs and the continued existence of facilities related to these programs, should be aggressively implemented.

MPC&A programs were funded at \$145 million per year in FY2000 and 2001. The Bush Administration sharply reduced its planned funding for MPC&A programs in FY2002, cutting the Energy Department’s initial \$200 million request to \$138.8 million. Wisely, the Bush Administration has requested \$233 million for MPC&A programs in its budget for FY2003.

⁷⁹ National Intelligence Council, *Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces*, February 2002. Also see “World Awash with Nuclear Weapons,” CNN.com, 7 March 2002 (www.cnn.com/2002/us/03/07/nuclear.report.reut/index.html).

IV. POLICY REFORMS REQUIRED TO ENHANCE HOMELAND SECURITY

Many initiatives to enhance homeland security in New York City and nationwide can be implemented by President Bush as a matter of policy. Among them are:

A. Effective Stewardship. All the funds in the world will fail to enhance security without experienced, motivated officials at the helm of critical government agencies. The Administration must immediately take two crucial steps:

(i) Empower the new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. The president was right to call for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security with a director subject to Senate confirmation. The new Department of Homeland Security will focus primarily on four areas:

- Analysis and synthesis of intelligence from all government agencies;
- Transportation and border security;
- Emergency preparedness and response; and
- Counter-measures for chemical, biological and radiological attacks.

Until this step was taken, White House Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge had no statutory authority, budget, or control over key security agencies and their personnel and was thus limited to serving as no more than a coordinator of efforts who could be blocked by bureaucratic turf battles. The president must now ensure that the new agency really does have effective control over national homeland security personnel, resources, and initiatives.

(ii) Appoint critical health officials. Almost a year and a half into his Administration, President Bush has yet to appoint officials to lead the Food and Drug Administration or the Centers for Disease Control, and he only nominated candidates for Surgeon-General and director of the National Institutes of Health on March 26. Until these critical positions are filled, these agencies – all of which would play an important role in identifying, responding to, and recovering from a biological or chemical attack – will be unable to organize themselves and mobilize their resources to the greatest extent possible.

V. LEGISLATION DESERVING OF SUPPORT

In most cases, enhancements to homeland security initiatives can be taken by making changes to federal, state, or local policies rather than by requiring new legislation. Increasing the number of local law enforcement officers who receive security clearances, for example, can be done without federal legislation. Appropriations of federal funds, of course, need to be provided by Congress, and many projects deserving of federal funding have been cited throughout this report.

In some cases, significant changes do require legislation or, because there is merit to providing consistent requirements or standards nationwide, should be directed by federal legislation. Several legislative initiatives that will enhance homeland security efforts are outlined here.

- A. **New legislation:** New legislation is required to address a number of critical issues that have otherwise not been addressed, including:
 1. **Liability for emergency medical workers:** The president is in the process of establishing a Medical Reserve Corps, a network of retired doctors, nurses, paramedics, and other medical professionals who can be mobilized in case of disaster to augment the work of other health care workers. However, many of these retired health care providers will no longer possess valid professional licenses or carry appropriate insurance, leaving them vulnerable to legal liability for the care they render during a humanitarian emergency. It may be necessary to introduce legislation that would remove the risk of civil liability for any mobilized member of the Medical Reserve Corps or any retired medical professional who renders emergency assistance in the wake of a terrorist attack. I will work with the White House, Congressional leaders, and other interested stakeholders to see to it that there are no legal impediments that would prevent medical professionals from providing emergency medical care to victims of terrorist attacks.
- B. **Existing Legislation:** Countless bills have been introduced in Congress to address the myriad homeland security issues that our country faces. A number of them are deserving of support. They include:
 1. **Information-Sharing:**
 - A. *The Federal-Local Information Sharing Partnership Act* (S. 1615, sponsored by Sen. Chuck Schumer) and its companion bill in the House (H.R. 3285, sponsored by Rep. Anthony Weiner) call for important measures to enhance information-sharing among federal, state, and local agencies. The bill would amend the federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the federal criminal code, and the USA PATRIOT Act to authorize the sharing of grand jury information, electronic, wire, and oral interception

information, and foreign intelligence information, respectively, with state or local law enforcement personnel. By removing a number of the legal barriers now in place that prevent federal officials from immediately sharing information with their local counterparts, this legislation would make it easier for the FBI to work with local emergency response officials on preventing and preparing for possible terrorist attacks. The legislation permits the federal government to share with local officials information that can already be shared among federal agencies. The bill has bipartisan support and is being co-sponsored by Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Ranking Member Orrin Hatch.

- B. *The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act* (H.R. 4598) directs the president to prescribe procedures under which federal agencies may share classified homeland security information with appropriate state and local personnel, including through security clearance investigations, non-disclosure agreements, and increased use of information-sharing partnerships.
- C. *The Intergovernmental Law Enforcement Information Sharing Act of 2001* (H.R. 3483) directs the Attorney General to carry out security clearance investigations for, and to grant appropriate security clearances to: (1) every Governor who applies for a security clearance; (2) at least one senior law enforcement official for each state or territory; (3) law enforcement officers from state, territorial, and local agencies that participate in federal counter-terrorism working groups or joint or regional terrorism task forces; and (4) the chiefs, commissioners, sheriffs, or comparable officials who head state, territorial, and local agencies that participate in such working groups or task forces. It also directs the Attorney General to ensure that information systems are configured to allow efficient sharing of information among federal, state, territorial, and local officials and agencies. The bill is currently being considered by the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime.

- 2. **Distribution of Confiscated Terrorist Assets.** *The Restoring Justice to the Victims of Terrorism Act* (H.R. 3703, sponsored by Rep Peter Hoekstra) calls for the government to make confiscated terrorist assets available to the victims of terrorism and their families. It would authorize the president to distribute assets frozen pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and similar Executive Orders to the victims and surviving family members of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, as well as to certain other charitable funds established as a result of those attacks.
- 3. **Block Grants.** *The Homeland Security Block Grant Act of 2002* (S. 2038, introduced by Senator Hillary Clinton, and H.R. 4059, introduced by Rep. Michael McNulty) would provide federal aid to local communities around

America to help them in their efforts to improve emergency response and public safety locally. These communities would be able to access federal funds to help make up anticipated revenue shortfalls. The bill would make funding available for additional law enforcement, fire, and emergency resources, improving cyber and infrastructure security, and devising a homeland security plan. It would also earmark specified sums for state and regional homeland defense planning, statewide training facilities and homeland best-practices clearinghouses, and first responder communication systems.

The bill would provide \$3.5 billion in funding to communities, with 70 percent of \$3 billion going directly to more than 1,000 cities and counties across the United States. The remaining 30 percent would be funneled to states to direct to smaller communities to help them improve security and public safety locally. New York City alone stands to receive \$72,765,000 in support under this bill. The Homeland Security Block Grant Act differs from President Bush's proposal in that it provides most of the funds to communities directly because they are most knowledgeable about their public safety needs, as opposed to routing the funding through the states.

4. Border Security

A. On May 14, the president signed *The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001* (H.R. 3525), which directs federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share with the INS and State Department information about the admissibility and deportation of non-U.S. citizens. It also:

- provides funding for an additional 400 INS inspectors and investigators over the next five years over the personnel levels already authorized in the terrorism bill;
- increases funding for training, facilities, and security-related technology for INS agents;
- requires every foreign visitor entering the United States to carry a travel document containing biometric identification; and
- strengthens the requirements that commercial passenger ships and airplanes entering the United States provide a list of passengers and crew before arrival.

B. *The Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPact) of 2001* would authorize:

- \$13 million for the development of scanners, for use by the Customs Service, that are capable of sensing biological and chemical contaminants in microscopic airborne quantities;

- \$105 million for the development and deployment of pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) technology at the 20 largest ports in the United States for use by the Customs Service;
- \$20 million for the development of biometric technology and \$30 million for the implementation of improved identification and biometric equipment at U.S. borders;
- \$80 million to increase the number of immigration officers at U.S. ports of entry and to increase the number of Border Patrol personnel to 15,000 by FY2003;
- \$36 million for increasing security in the issuing of visas and monitoring of visa holders;
- \$20 million to facilitate the exchange of information between the INS and U.S. consular officers abroad;
- \$30 million to better identify persons on a “watch list” and prevent their entry into the United States; and
- \$20 million to better track people who overstay their visas.

C. *The FY2002-2003 Customs Service Authorization Bill* (H.R. 3129), which has already passed the House, includes a number of provisions to bolster the Customs Service’s homeland security and counter-terrorism missions, including:

- Providing funding for the acquisition and deployment of anti-terrorist detection equipment along the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, including the acquisition and upgrade of vehicle and container inspection systems, mobile and fixed-site truck x-ray machines, and ultrasonic container inspection systems (for liquid cargo);
- Providing funding for a range of enhancements for computer connectivity, communications, counter-surveillance capabilities, and physical security;
- Specifying funds available to hire approximately 285 additional Customs Service officers to address the needs of the offices and ports along the U.S.-Canada border;
- Permitting emergency adjustments to offices, ports of entry, or staffing of the Customs Service;
- Requiring advance electronic transmission of passenger, crew, and cargo manifest information by motor, air, or vessel carriers; and
- Authorizing appropriations for the re-establishment of Customs Service operations in New York City.

5. **Rail Security**

A. The Senate should pass *The Rail Security Act of 2001* (S. 1550), introduced by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, which would provide Amtrak with emergency appropriations to make critical security enhancements in the northeast and throughout the country. (Amtrak's 2003 authorization bills, H.R. 4545 and S. 1991, also contain many of the security-related provisions outlined by the Rail Security Act.) Among the enhancements it would fund are:

- (i) \$515 million for system-wide security upgrades, including reimbursement of extraordinary security-related costs incurred by Amtrak since September 11, such as the hiring and training of additional police officers, canine-assisted security units, and surveillance equipment;
- (ii) \$998 million to complete New York tunnel life safety projects and rehabilitate of tunnels in Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Maryland; and
- (iii) \$254 million to increase accessibility of New York's Penn Station for safety and emergency response situations; improved safety operations through an advanced civil speed enforcement system radio system in high-speed territory; and renovation of two bridges (the Thames and Niantic) in Connecticut.

The bill would also expand the jurisdiction of rail police to protect public safety in jurisdictions where any rail carrier owns property.

B. The Administration should support calls for legislation by Senators Biden and Schumer that would allocate \$3 billion for new security equipment, training, and personnel to strengthen security for Amtrak and all passenger rail systems. Approximately \$1.5 billion would be used for an aggressive, nationwide security upgrade, featuring a host of new security measures and requirements, potentially including:

- (i) Instituting stringent ID checks for all rail passengers;
- (ii) Conducting baggage scans and random luggage inspections;
- (iii) Adding more police officers, security personnel, and new K-9 units patrolling railway facilities;
- (iv) Establishing new and upgraded training programs for railway security personnel;
- (v) Installing a new communications system enabling Amtrak to install satellite technology on all trains and build a state-of-the-art train tracking and locator unit;

- (vi) Installing a hazardous material and explosives detection and response system; and
- (vii) Modernizing railroad tunnels in the New York, Washington and Baltimore areas in order to meet current fire and life-safety standards, providing better ventilation and new escape routes in the event of emergency.

6. **Security for Bus Terminals and Inter-City Bus Operators:** The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee approved *The Emergency Over-The-Road Bus Security Assistance* bill (H.R. 3429), which authorizes \$400 million in security grants to private bus companies, on May 22. The U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation approved an almost identical bill (S.1739) on April 18.

The grants made available could be used to:

- Make system-wide security improvements;
- Construct or modify garages, facilities or buses to assure security;
- Upgrade, purchase, or install ticketing systems;
- Train employees in recognizing terrorist threats and evacuation procedures;
- Establish and implement passenger screening procedures and baggage inspection;
- Expand the hiring of security officers; and
- Install cameras and video surveillance equipment and establish emergency communications systems linked to police and emergency personnel.

Under these bills, grants would be applied for by operators for the purposes of protecting their drivers, implementing passenger screening programs, constructing or modifying existing terminals, training employees in threat assessment, and hiring security officers and installing video surveillance and communications equipment. Agencies that are not bus operators and do not directly provide over-the-road bus transportation services would appear not to be eligible for these grants.

Bus operators, however, are not the only ones to provide services to bus passengers. Public transportation agencies around the country subsidize bus transit by providing major terminal facilities, connections to other modes of transportation, and policing and other vital security services. The final version of this legislation should recognize the substantial contribution terminal operators make to bus transit safety and security. Operators of bus terminals should therefore also be eligible for direct grants for security related purposes.

7. Critical Infrastructure Protection

- A. The House passed *The Water Infrastructure Security and Research Development Act* (H.R. 3178, sponsored by Rep Sherwood Boehlert) on December 18, and the Senate is still considering its companion bill (S. 1593, introduced by Sen. James Jeffords). The bill directs the Environmental Protection Agency to establish a six-year R&D and demonstration grant program to achieve improvements to technologies and related processes for the security of water supply systems, especially against biological, chemical, or radiological contamination. It would also require the dissemination of the program's results to managers of water supply systems. The bill would authorize \$72 million for these programs over FY2002-FY2007.

- B. *The Pipeline Infrastructure Protection to Enhance Security and Safety Act* (H.R. 3609) revises pipeline safety provisions to require the Secretary of Transportation to assess the vulnerabilities of pipeline facilities to terrorist attacks and to require pipeline operators to develop and implement terrorism security programs. The bill reauthorizes the Transportation Department's Office of Pipeline Safety through 2005 at \$262.8 million per year. It passed the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on May 22.

- C. *The Energy Pipeline Research, Development, and Demonstration Act* (H.R. 3929), introduced by Rep. Ralph Hall, directs the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop and implement a cooperative federal research, development, demonstration, and standardization program to ensure the integrity of pipeline facilities. The bill authorizes \$100 million through 2006 to implement the provisions.

- D. *S. 1608*, introduced by Sen. Bob Smith, would authorize \$50 million in grants to drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate security needs.

- E. Title II of the *Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001* (H.R. 3255) would authorize funding in FY2002 for a wide range of security measures at water facilities, including:
 - \$66 million for vulnerability assessments;
 - \$55 million for emergency response plans;
 - \$3 million for R&D;
 - \$60 million for basic physical security enhancements; and
 - \$80 million for electronic security.

- F. *H.R. 3227*, introduced by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, would authorize EPA to provide grants to public and non-governmental organizations for research on methods to combat biological contamination of public drinking water supplies.
- G. A bill to be introduced by Sen. Charles Schumer would create a national database of low-grade radioactive materials, many of which are used in medical facilities and laboratories and could be used by terrorists to make a “dirty bomb.” The bill would also tighten security requirements for facilities that produce and receive such materials, including nuclear power plants, and fund the Department of Energy to collect radioactive materials no longer in use. Industrial-use radioactive materials must be better controlled, and Senator Schumer’s bill is an excellent step toward ensuring that these easily accessible and potentially dangerous materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists.
- H. *Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 (H.R. 4775)*. The Supplemental Appropriations bill, passed by the House on May 24, appropriates \$378 million for additional security at nuclear facilities and various Army Corps of Engineers facilities.

8. First responders

- A. *Grants to first responders*. *The Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001 (H.R. 3255)* would provide \$500 million directly to local government and emergency response units to plan for emergencies. It would also provide \$250 million to fund counterterrorism training and provide related equipment to firefighters.
- B. *Communications priority for first responders*. *The Homeland Emergency Response Operations Act*, or HERO Act (H.R. 3397), would ensure that first responders and emergency workers have access to sufficient bandwidth to communicate in an emergency. It would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to direct the FCC to complete assignment of radio spectrum for public safety services by January 1, 2007.
- C. *Biological and chemical preparedness*: *The Biological and Chemical Weapons Preparedness Act (S. 1486)* would require that by 2010: (1) police and firefighters have adequate training and equipment to combat chemical and biological attacks; (2) sophisticated electronic disease surveillance and information exchange are in place; and (3) the health care and public health workforce has the necessary skills in key biopreparedness priority areas.
- D. *Urban search and rescue*: The National Urban Search and Rescue Task Force Assistance Act of 2002 (S. 2061) would provide \$160 million in 2002 to support training and equipment for the 28 FEMA task forces that comprise the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, each

of which would receive at least \$1.5 million. Each task force is currently in need of additional training and support equipment, as each task force is deployed with some 80,000 pounds of equipment valued at some \$1,800,000. While these task forces were originally created for earthquake response, these highly capable task forces have an expanding and vital role in responding to acts of terrorism, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. By noon of September 12, 2001, eight task forces were working valiantly with New York firefighters to address the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, and four task forces responded to the attacks on the Pentagon; 25 of the 28 task forces were deployed over a three-week period.

- E. Supplemental Appropriations. The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations bill (H.R. 4775), passed by the House on May 24, appropriates \$175 million for first responder grants funded through the Office of Homeland Security. It also appropriates \$8 million for the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences to study the health effects on police, fire and other personnel of responding to terrorist attacks.
- F. Recognition for public safety officers. I introduced a resolution (H.Con.Res. 243), which both the House and Senate approved, calling on the president to award and present a Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor to those public safety officers who were killed and to those select public safety officers who have earned special recognition for outstanding valor above and beyond the call of duty in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.

9. Health Care

- A. Create vaccine clearinghouse. Recent studies by the Centers for Disease Control show that there is a shortage of 8 out of the 23 vaccines given in the United States. To address this problem, I have introduced H.R. 4100, *The Healthy Families Promotion Act*, to ensure that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) adequately oversees the production and stockpiling of vaccines and the development and periodic review of an emergency response and contingency plan regarding vaccines

This bill would create a central clearinghouse at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to oversee federal and private vaccine purchase and distribution contracts so that the supply and distribution of these vaccines are known. My bill ensures that one person, reporting to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, knows who ordered which vaccine, how much they ordered, whether or not the production schedule is on track, who is responsible for the delivery, and whether or not the delivery was made on time. HHS needs such a mechanism to anticipate and prevent vaccine shortages – an important first step in combating bioterrorism.

The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001, signed into law by the president on June 12, authorizes \$640 million for the establishment of a national pharmaceutical stockpile.

- B. *Potassium Iodide (KI)*. Several bills contain provisions that address the need to stockpile potassium iodide near nuclear facilities.
- (i) *The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001* (H.R. 3448), signed into law by the president on June 12, requires KI tablets to be included in a national stockpile of emergency medical supplies for distribution to public facilities in quantities sufficient to provide adequate protection for the population within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant.
 - (ii) *The Nuclear Security Act of 2001* (S. 1746), introduced Senator Harry Reid, would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to:
 - ensure that KI tablets have been stockpiled at public facilities within 50 miles of nuclear facilities; and
 - develop plans to promptly distribute stockpiled KI tablets to all individuals within 50 miles of nuclear facilities after a radioactive release.
 - (iii) H.R. 3382, introduced by Representative Edward Markey, also called *The Nuclear Security Act of 2001*, would require NRC to:
 - ensure sufficient KI tablets are stockpiled in individual homes within 50 miles of nuclear facilities; and
 - ensure that sufficient KI tablets are stockpiled at public facilities between 50 and 200 miles from nuclear facilities.
 - (iv) A bill introduced by Representative Phil English (*H.R. 783*) would require the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), NRC, and other agencies to implement a plan for stockpiling potassium iodide tablets in areas within a 50-mile radius of a nuclear power plant. The plan must include a strategy for the storage and delivery of such tablets to persons who may be affected by a disaster at such a plant.
 - (v) A Sense of Congress resolution by Representative George Gekas (*H.Con.Res. 267*) urges the president to direct NRC, FEMA, and other agencies to establish emergency reserves of potassium iodide tablets in communities within the emergency planning zones of each of the 64 U.S. nuclear power sites.

10. Port Security

- A. *The Maritime Transportation Anti-Terrorism Act* (H.R. 3983) would place armed sea marshals on ships and at facilities to deter or respond to threats of terrorism; prescribe conditions of entry or deny entry into the United

States to any vessel arriving from a foreign port that does not meet anti-terrorism security standards; develop procedures for screening passenger and crew manifests and containerized cargo; require 96 hours advance notice to the U.S. Coast Guard by any ship entering U.S. territorial waters; require port vulnerability assessments; require national and regional maritime transportation antiterrorism plans; and mandate limitations on access to secure areas in ports to authorized personnel who are subject to background checks.

- B. *The Port and Maritime Security Act* (S. 1214) includes proposals for \$168 million over four years for equipment to detect weapons of mass destruction at U.S. seaports; \$16.5 million for the Transportation Department to develop standards and implement a curriculum to allow for the training and certification of maritime security professionals and law enforcement officers; \$176 million in loan guarantees and \$420 million in grants through 2006 for improvements to port security infrastructure improvements; and \$145 million for the United States Customs Service for fiscal year 2002 for 1,200 new customs inspector positions, 300 new customs agent positions, and other necessary port security positions, and for purchase and support of equipment (including camera systems for docks and vehicle-mounted computers), canine enforcement for port security, and to update computer systems.
- C. *The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act* (H.R. 4775), which passed in the House on May 24, appropriates \$210 million for the Coast Guard, \$33 million more than requested. The total includes \$36 million to purchase additional patrol boats and \$12 million in extra funds for additional port vulnerability assessments.

11. Cyber security

- A. Funding for Cyberspace security. The Administration has requested \$4.5 billion in FY2003 for information technology security for federal agencies. The Administration has requested no funds to provide matching grants for state and local governments, which also must make extensive improvements to the security of their information technology. *The USA Act* (H.R. 3555) would provide \$2 billion for such matching grants.
- B. University research grants. *The Cyber Security Research and Development Act* (H.R. 3394) calls for \$300 million to be spent over five years to fund university and private industry research to protect computer systems from sabotage.

- 12. Non-proliferation. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, also called “Nunn-Lugar” after the sponsors of the legislation that established it in 1992, has launched aggressive efforts to safeguard and eliminate the chemical

and biological weapons arsenals that are located in former Soviet republics. The Nunn-Lugar Program has been used to upgrade the security surrounding these dangerous substances and to provide civilian employment to tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists. We are now beginning efforts to construct facilities that will destroy the Russian arsenal of chemical warheads.

The Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction Expansion Act (S. 2026), introduced by Senator Richard Lugar, would authorize the Secretary of Defense to expend up to \$50 million for a fiscal year in Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and other weapons outside the former Soviet Union. Currently, the use of such funds is limited to former Soviet republics. As Senator Lugar stated when he introduced the bill in the Senate, “we must keep the world's most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people.” Given that the risk of nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation extends to facilities in a wide range of other countries, the Defense Department should have the ability to embark upon programs that will help reduce the proliferation risk wherever it may be.

13. **Supplemental Appropriations.** The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775), which passed in the House on May 24, appropriates \$5.8 billion for homeland security, \$522 million more than the president's request, including:
 - (i) \$3.9 billion for the newly created Transportation Security Administration, including funds for baggage explosive detection systems, secure cockpit doors and grants to port authorities for security enhancements at U.S. ports;
 - (ii) \$175 million in first responder grants, funded through the Office of Homeland Security, not the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as requested by the president;
 - (iii) \$8 million for the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences to study the health effects on police, fire and other personnel of responding to terrorist attacks;
 - (iv) \$378 million for additional security at nuclear facilities and various Army Corps of Engineers facilities (\$352 more than requested by the Administration);
 - (v) \$63 million in unrequested funds for law enforcement agencies at the Treasury Department, including \$16 million for the federal Law Enforcement Training Center for additional training of new Transportation Security Administration personnel and \$29 million to the Secret Service for additional protective details;

- (vi) \$210 million for the Coast Guard, \$33 million more than requested. The total includes \$36 million to purchase additional patrol boats and \$12 million in extra funds for additional port vulnerability assessments; and
- (vii) \$194 million for Justice Department homeland security activities, including \$112 million for the federal Bureau of Investigation and \$75 million for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The bill also provides the president's request of nearly \$5.5 billion to help New York recover from the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, including \$1.8 billion to rebuild mass transportation, \$2.8 billion in emergency disaster relief, and \$167 million in emergency funding to fully fund the restoration and reconstruction of roads around the World Trade Center.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the contributions made by a number of individuals and organizations to the compilation of this report.

- State Assembly Member Michael N. Gianaris, who represents Astoria, Queens, provided valuable perspectives on the local community's concerns.
- LaGuardia Community College provided much appreciated logistical assistance for a February 26 Symposium on Homeland Security, which was a success largely due to the organizational skills of Michael McSweeney, LaGuardia's Director of Legislative and Community Affairs.
- The panelists at my February 26 Symposium provided excellent insights into the priorities of government organizations at the federal, state, and local level, as well as the concerns of the private sector entities in the City that face significant new security challenges since September 11th. I want to express my appreciation for the analyses provided by Jerry McCarty of FEMA, Mark Cohen of the New York State Office of Public Security, Assistant Police Chief Joanne Jaffe, John Paczkowski of the Port Authority, Terrence Cox of Con Ed, and Ron Thompson of Keyspan Energy. I want to thank Jerry McCarty in particular for participating in several of the town hall meetings that I hosted. I greatly appreciate his help and friendship during these difficult times.
- I hosted several town hall meetings in order to hear constituents' opinions and concerns on homeland security and the war on terrorism. Special thanks are due to the Juniper Park Civic Association and the United Community Civic Association. Rose Marie Poveromo, the president of the United Community Civic Association, has taken a leadership role on these and on a wide range of other issues, and I thank her for her contributions to the community.
- Finally, I must acknowledge the extraordinary work by my staff in Washington and New York to put together symposia and meetings, discuss security issues with constituents, and compile this report. Special thanks go to Larry Hanauer, a Department of Defense Legislative Fellow in my office, who provided invaluable research and analysis on the full range of homeland security issues.

APPENDIX 1

**DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS
TASK FORCE ON HOMELAND SECURITY**

MEMBERS

- Anibal Acevedo-Vila (PR)
- Gary Ackerman (NY)
- Thomas Allen (ME)
- Joe Baca (CA)
- Shelley Berkley (NV)
- Sanford Bishop (GA)
- Robert Borski (PA)
- Lois Capps (CA)
- Michael Capuano (MA)
- James Clyburn (SC)
- John Conyers (MI)
- Jerry Costello (IL)
- Joseph Crowley (NY)
- Jim Davis (FL)
- Peter DeFazio (OR)
- William Delahunt (MA)
- Rosa DeLauro (CT)
- Norman Dicks (WA)
- Lloyd Doggett (TX)
- Chet Edwards (TX)
- Eliot Engel (NY)
- Harold Ford (TN)
- Barney Frank (MA)
- Jane Harman (CA)
- Alcee Hastings (FL)
- Rubén Hinojosa (TX)
- Tim Holden (PA)
- Eleanor Holmes Norton (DC)
- Rush Holt (NJ)
- Mike Honda (CA)
- Darlene Hooley (OR)
- Steny Hoyer (MD)
- Jay Inslee (WA)
- Steve Israel (NY)
- Sheila Jackson-Lee
- Ron Kind (WI)
- Jim Langevin (RI)
- Tom Lantos (CA)
- Rick Larsen (WA)
- John Larson (CT)
- William Lipinski (IL)
- Nita Lowey (NY)
- Bill Luther (MN)
- James Maloney (CT)
- Jim Matheson (UT)
- Jim McDermott (WA)
- Mike McIntyre (NC)
- Robert Menendez (NJ) - CHAIR
- Juanita Millender-McDonald (CA)
- John Murtha (PA)
- Richard Neal (MA)
- James Oberstar (MN)
- Solomon Ortiz (TX)
- Frank Pallone (NJ)
- Bill Pascrell (NJ)
- Nancy Pelosi (CA)
- Silvestre Reyes (TX)
- Ciro Rodriguez (TX)
- Mike Ross (AR)
- Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA)
- Martin Sabo (MN)
- Max Sandlin (TX)
- Janice Schakowsky (IL)
- Adam Schiff (CA)
- Robert Scott (VA)
- Brad Sherman (CA)
- Ike Skelton (MO)
- John Spratt (SC)
- Bart Stupak (MI)
- Ellen Tauscher (CA)
- Gene Taylor (MS)
- Mike Thompson (CA)
- Jim Turner (TX)
- Mark Udall (CO)
- Tom Udall (NM)
- Anthony Weiner (NY)

APPENDIX 2

Panelists

Symposia and Town Hall Meetings on Homeland Security

**Sponsored and Moderated
by Congressman Joseph Crowley**

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**Young Israel of Pelham Parkway
Bronx, NY
4 November 2001**

- Tony Rosario
Postmaster
U.S. Postal Service
- Detective Nick Stanich
Community Affairs
49th Precinct, NYPD
- Joe Orlando
Senior VP & Executive Director
Jacobi Medical Center
- Dr. Kevin Brown
Emergency Room Director
Jacobi Medical Center
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director
for Readiness, Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**Maspeth Town Hall
Maspeth, NY
19 November 2001**

- William Rogers
Postmaster-Flushing
U.S. Postal Service
- Chief Edward Cannon
Executive Officer
NYC Police Department
Patrol Borough Queens North
- Dario Centorcelli
Director of External Affairs
Elmhurst Hospital
- Dr. Joe Masci
Director of Infection Control
Elmhurst Hospital
- Pete Velez
Senior Vice President
Queens Health Network
- Robert Baker
Director of Emergency Management
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director
for Readiness, Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**Middletown Senior Center
Bronx, NY
26 November 2001**

- Tony Rosario
Postmaster
U.S. Postal Service
- Joe Orlando
Senior VP & Executive Director
Jacobi Medical Center
- Dr. Mike Touger
Emergency Medical Director
Jacobi Medical Center
- Detective Nick Stanich
Community Affairs
49th Precinct, NYPD
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director
for Readiness, Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**Mitchell Linden
Whitestone, NY
10 December 2001**

- William Rogers
Postmaster-Flushing
U.S. Postal Service
- Chief Edward Cannon
Executive Officer
NYC Police Department
Patrol Borough Queens North
- Dario Centorcelli
Director of External Affairs
Elmhurst Hospital
- Dr. Joe Masci
Director of Infection Control
Elmhurst Hospital
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director
for Readiness, Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**P.S. 149
Corona, NY
17 December 2001**

- Chief Edward Cannon
Executive Officer
NYC Police Department
Patrol Borough Queens North
- Dario Centorcelli
Director of External Affairs
Elmhurst Hospital
- Dr. Joe Masci
Director of Infection Control
Elmhurst Hospital
- Sgt. Bill Williams
Intelligence Division
NYPD
- Keith Casey
Queens North Task Force
- Captain James Albrecht
Transit District 20
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director
for Readiness, Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Symposium on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**LaGuardia Community College
Long Island City, NY
26 February 2002**

PANEL 1: NEW YORK'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH

- Jerry McCarty, Senior Officer for Office of National Preparedness and Acting Division Director for Readiness, Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Mark Cohen, Assistant Director and Chief Counsel, New York State Office of Public Security
- Joanne Jaffe, Assistant Chief and Commanding Officer, Office of Management Analysis and Planning, New York Police Department

PANEL 2: PROTECTING NEW YORK'S KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

- John Paczkowski, Director of Security, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
- Rear Admiral Richard E. Bennis, USCG, Commander of New York Activities, U.S. Coast Guard
- Terrence Cox, Director of Security Services, Consolidated Edison
- Ron Thompson, Director of Security, Keyspan Energy

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

**Augustana Lutheran Church –United Communities Civic Association
Astoria Heights, NY
7 March 2002**

- Mike Menasche
Postmaster-Long Island City
U.S. Postal Service
- Patrick Walsh
Warden, Rikers Island
NYC Department of Corrections
- Peter Cursio
Deputy Warden, Rikers Island
NYC Dept. of Corrections
- James O'Brien
Deputy Inspector, NYPD
Commander 114th Precinct
- Chris Jamison
Inspector
Commander 115th Precinct
- Ray Wehlan
Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)
- Paul Hamilton
Associate Chief of Emergency
Medicine
Mount Sinai of Queens
- Asif Muhammad
Attending Physician, Emergency
Medicine
Mount Sinai of Queens
- Linda Hackett
Manager of Community Relations
Mount Sinai of Queens
- John Odermatt
NYC Office of Emergency
Management (OEM)
- Jerry McCarty
Senior Officer for Office of
National Preparedness and Acting
Division Director for Readiness,
Response and Recovery
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)

Panelists

Town Hall Meeting on Homeland Security

Sponsored and Moderated by Congressman Joseph Crowley

Juniper Park Civic Association

Middle Village, Queens, NY

13 June 2002

- Michael Bloomberg
Mayor
City of New York
- Chris Hetherington
Homeland Security Liaison
NYC Office of Emergency Management
- Dr. Joseph Masci
Director of Infection Control
Elmhurst/Queens Health Network (Elmhurst Hospital)
- Chief Edward Cannon
Executive Officer
NYC Police Department
Patrol Borough Queens North
- Sean Waters
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)